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Abstract
In this paper we advance the state-of-the-art on the application of second-order propo-
sitional modal logic (SOPML) in the representation of individual and group knowledge,
as well as temporal and spatial reasoning. The main theoretical contributions of the
paper can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we introduce the language of (multi-modal)
SOPML and interpret it on a variety of different classes of Kripke frames according to
the features of the accessibility relations and of the algebraic structure of the quantifica-
tion domain of propositions. We provide axiomatisations for some of these classes, and
show that SOPML is unaxiomatisable on the remaining classes. Secondly, we introduce
novel notions of (bi)simulations and prove that they indeed preserve the interpretation of
formulas in (the universal fragment of) SOPML. Then, we apply this formal machinery
to study the expressiveness of Second-order Propositional Epistemic Logic (SOPEL) in
representing higher-order knowledge, i.e., the knowledge agents have about other agents’
knowledge, as well as graph-theoretic notions (e.g., 3-colorability, Hamiltonian paths,
etc.) The final outcome is a rich formalism to represent and reason about relevant con-
cepts in artificial intelligence, while still having a model checking problem that is no more
computationally expensive than that of the less expressive quantified boolean logic.
Keywords: Modal logic, Knowledge representation, Second-order propositional modal
logic, Epistemic logic, Local properties
1. Introduction
Modal logic is nowadays a well-established area in mathematical logic, which has also
become one of the most popular formal frameworks in artificial intelligence for knowledge
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representation and reasoning [7, 26]. This success is due to several reasons, including an
expressive and flexible formal language, which enjoys nice computational properties. In5
particular, at the core of the semantics of modal logic lies the notion of world, or state.
Indeed, this concept is very natural when studying computational notions (a system
evolving over time from a previous to a successive state), accounts of agency (states
that are preferred, desired, or epistemically possible), and of interaction (states that can
be winning, losing, terminal, initial, etc.). Indeed, distributed computing [25], reactive10
systems [43], multi-agent systems [32], and game theory [31] have all benefited from
the application of tools and techniques from modal logic, and this list is by no means
exhaustive. Most importantly, the worlds in the models for modal logic are connected
by means of indexed relations Ra, for some index a, which model (program) transitions,
epistemic or desired alternatives, or the effect of possible moves, where index a can assume15
a number of readings: a specific program, a dimension of time, say, future or past, an
agent, a move, etc. Each accessibility relation Ra in the semantics is then paired with a
necessity operator ◻a in the modal language, where a formula ◻aϕ is then true in a world
w of a model, if ϕ is true in every world v that is a-accessible from w (see Definition 8 for
a formal definition). Informally, this may be read as: after every execution of a, in each20
future time along dimension a, in every world considered possible or desired by agent a,
or in every world that is the result of performing move a, formula ϕ holds.
The language of modal logic provides a crisp, variable-free way of expressing a variety
of properties of interest. It is also important to realise that there is not just one modal
logic: although the well-known normal axiomatisation K characterises the class of va-25
lidities on all models for modal logic, this does not mean that all logics for, say, agency,
are the same and correspond to K. It only means that they are typically extensions of
K. As a simple example, the property (i) ◻aϕ→ ϕ appears reasonable when ◻a denotes
‘agent a knows that . . . ’, but is perhaps less desirable when it is read as ‘agent a believes
that . . . ’, as philosophically knowledge is analysed as truthful belief [28]. One of the30
reasons for the success of modal logic is that in many relevant cases a syntactic scheme
corresponds to an additional constraint on the accessibility relation Ra: in the case of
(i), reflexivity of Ra is, in a precise sense, sufficient and necessary for its validity.
To appreciate this point, we use a little bit more detail (we assume some familiarity
with modal logic, precise definitions are given in Section 2). As already mentioned, central35
in the semantics of modal logic is the notion of (Kripke) frame F , which comprises of a
set W of worlds and accessibility relations Ra, for indices a ∈ I. We can then define a
notion of validity ⊧ on frames and formulate the result mentioned above as follows:
Ra is reflexive iff F ⊧ ◻aϕ→ ϕ, for all formulas ϕ (1)
Characterisations such as (1) are referred to as correspondence results [6], because
they establish a correspondence between a first-order property on frames (i.e., reflexivity)40
and a modal validity (i.e., (i)). Another example of correspondence is that between the
first-order formula ∀x∀y(Ra(x, y) → Rb(x, y)) and modal schema ◻bϕ → ◻aϕ, which
intuitively says that, e.g., whatever is achieved by program b, is also achieved by a, or
that a knows at least as much as b.
Mathematically elegant and powerful as correspondence theory may be, it also has45
shortcomings. Firstly, note that in the case of (1), correspondence is defined globally, i.e.,
(i) has to be valid throughout the frame. This means that for instance (using a doxastic
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reading of (i)), we cannot model situations in which a’s beliefs are true, but b does not
know that. Indeed, if the truthfulness of agent a’s beliefs is tantamount to the validity
of (i), then (ii) Kb(◻aϕ→ ϕ) is also a validity, enforcing agent b’s knowledge.50
Secondly, in (1) quantification appears at the meta-, and therefore the outermost,
level. It is therefore impossible to distinguish (and to express in the language of modal
logic) the following two situations: in the first, b knows that a has perfect information
and is a perfect reasoner, and therefore, b knows a priori that whatever a believes must
be correct. Informally, this would be represented as Kb( for all φ (◻aφ → φ)), which is55
not a well-formed formula however. In the second situation b has verified, for every ϕ
that a happens to believe, that ϕ is in fact true. Informally, this would be represented
as (for all φ, Kb(◻aφ→ φ)).
As observed in [3], by allowing for quantification over propositions – and thus ob-
taining the language of second-order propositional modal logic (sopml) – both issues60
mentioned above can be addressed. The formal definition of ∀pψ is given in Defini-
tion 8, but informally, given a valuation V which tells us in which worlds V (p) the atom
p is true, ∀pψ holds if for every V ′ that differs from V in at most the set V (p) (i.e.,
V ′(q) = V (q) for all q ≠ p), the formula ψ holds. As regards the first example, the sopml
formula ∀p(◻ap → p) ∧ ¬Kb∀p(◻ap → p) intuitively expresses that all beliefs of agent a65
are correct, but b does not know this fact. Moreover, the two different readings in the
second example can be represented by formulas Kb∀p(◻ap → p) and ∀pKb(◻ap → p),
respectively. Readers familiar with the philosophy literature on the topic may recognize
the difference between Kb∀p(◻ap → p) and ∀pKb(◻ap → p) as the distinction between
de dicto and de re quantification.70
Importantly, the truth of ∀p(◻ap → p) at world w enforces the truthfulness of agent
a’s beliefs in w only, therefore this is a local property of the frame, as opposed to the global
validity of (i). This fact allows agent b to consider (epistemically) possible a different
world w′ in which (i) does not hold.
The aim of this paper is to further the applications of propositional quantification75
and second-order propositional modal logic in knowledge representation and reasoning,
through exploring and securing their theoretical foundations. In particular, the original
contributions of the paper can be summarised as follows.
Firstly, in Section 2 we introduce the language of multi-agent second-order proposi-
tional modal logic, and provide it with a semantics in terms of Kripke frames extended80
with a domain D of sets of worlds for the interpretation of quantification. The differences
between our definition and the existing definitions of sopml (e.g. [11, 21, 37]) are that
(i) in addition to the full, boolean and unrestricted domains of quantification that were
studied before, we also consider modal domains, and (ii) we use a multi-agent language,
which allows us to express higher-order properties of knowledge, i.e., knowledge about85
other agents’ knowledge, including truthfulness of knowledge, inclusion of one agent’s
knowledge in that of another.
In Section 3 we illustrate the richness of the formal framework, particularly to express
local properties in modal logic (lpml) [16, 17]. We compare and contrast our approach
with [18], and show that the latter can be subsumed in the account here put forward.90
This validates our endeavour from the viewpoint of applications. However, we maintain
that for sopml to be adopted as a specification language in artificial intelligence and
knowledge representation, appropriate theoretical results and formal tools need to be
developed.
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To this end, in Section 4 we present a number of results about the axiomatisation of95
several classes of validites. The key findings are that (i) with the exception of single-
agent S5, sopml is unaxiomatisable over all of the commonly used classes of frames,
when a full domain of quantification is considered; (ii) on frames with a coarser domain
of quantification, sopml without a common knowledge operator is axiomatisable, but
sopml* with common knowledge is unaxiomatisable in general. As a by-product we100
obtain several undecidability results.
Furthermore, in Section 5 we develop original truth-preserving bisimulations for
sopml. Bisimulations bring to the fore when two models can be considered the same,
and they can be used to test the limits of what can be expressed: when two models for
a language L are bisimilar but disagree on some property Φ ∈ L′, it shows that Φ is not105
expressible in L. We provide several instances of such occurrences. To conclude, our
main aim in this paper is to provide formal tools so as to facilitate the use of sopml
as a language for knowledge representation, as well as temporal and spatial reasoning in
artificial intelligence.
1.1. Related Work.110
This contribution is inspired by a series of papers on lpml, an extension of proposi-
tional modal logic to express local properties [16, 17, 18]. Here, instead of introducing
an ad hoc language (with an adjustment for each local property one has in mind), we
make use of the general framework of second-order propositional multi-modal logic. In
Section 3 we provide a detailed comparison of the two approaches.115
Mono-modal sopml was first considered in [11, 21, 37], mainly in relation with ax-
iomatisability and (un)decidability questions. In particular, [21] provided several axioma-
tisations for normal modal logics interpreted on a variety of classes of frames. However,
it considered only mono-modal languages, whereas here we adopt a multi-modal perspec-
tive. Then, [37] proved decidability and independence results pertaining to second-order120
extensions of the mono-modal logic S5. Notwithstanding these early, significant results,
the high computational complexity of sopml and some undecidability and unaxiomatis-
ability results might partially explain why sopml has been studied far less than propo-
sitional modal logic, and it has been virtually unexplored as a specification language for
knowledge representation and reasoning. For instance, only recently sopml has been125
proved complete w.r.t. the algebraic semantics in which quantification is interpreted on
arbitrary meets and joints [33]. Here we consider a multi-modal version of sopml, and
its epistemic counterpart: second-order propositional epistemic logic (sopel).
Among the more recent contributions, [36] shows that there is a validity-preserving
translation from second-order logic to sopml, for modalities weaker than or equal to130
S4.2, implying that for these modalities sopml is unaxiomatisable. Hereafter we add
to the picture and show that multi-modal S5 is unaxiomatisable as well. Further, [12]
provided sopml with analogues of the van Benthem-Rosen and Goldblatt-Thomason
theorems, while in [22] propositional quantification and bisimulations are analysed in the
context of modal logic. However, the kind of quantification considered in [22] is preserved135
by standard bisimulations, and therefore the resulting logic is provably as expressive as
epistemic logic, strictly weaker than sopml. In [39, 40] the author proves that the quan-
tifier alternation hierarchy of sopml formulas induces an infinite corresponding semantic
hierarchy over the class of finite directed graphs. As a by-product, he obtains that, for
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this class of structures, sopml with the universal modality and Monadic Second-Order140
Logic are equally expressive.
Propositional quantification has also been considered in the context of richer modal
languages, namely the temporal logics ltl and ctl. A quantified version of ltl, called
qltl, has been introduced and analysed in [49, 48], mainly in relation with the verifica-
tion of reactive systems. In particular, the model-checking problem for the k-alternation145
fragment was proved to be k-EXPSPACE-complete. More recently, [41] discusses qctl,
a quantified version of the braching-time temporal logic ctl. The authors prove sev-
eral complexity and expressivity results for a logic that has more modal operators than
sopml. They also consider two different kinds of semantics for their logic: the former
is comparable to sopml on full frames, while the latter is based on tree-unwindings. To150
our knowledge, no results are known about the relative expressivity of qctl and sopml.
It is also outside the scope of this paper to find such results, although it is an interesting
question for future research.
More directly related to the present contribution are [3, 4] by some of the authors.
In [3] we introduced epistemic quantified boolean logic (eqbl), an epistemic variant155
of sopml, and provided axiomatisability and model-checking results. Differently from
the reference, here we tackle general sopml, defined also on modalities strictly weaker
than S5. Indeed, in this paper we analyse all normal modalities. Moreover, we provide
novel unaxiomatisability and undecidability results, as well as give full details on the
construction of the canonical models to prove completeness. As regards [4], we define a160
novel notion of (bi)simulation that generalises the one given therein. Finally, we apply
these results to analyse the expressivity of sopml in capturing relevant properties in
temporal and spatial reasoning.
These investigations have been extended to public announcement logic (pal). Specif-
ically, in [5] the authors applied propositional quantification to pal to analyses arbitrary165
public announcements and to formalise notions such as preservation, successfulness, and
knowability. Hereafter we do not consider such extensions and keep on a purely epistemic
setting.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the formal machinery that will be used throughout the170
rest of the paper, and we prove some preliminary results. First, we present the language
of second-order propositional modal logic (sopml), some of its fragments, and their
interpretation on Kripke frames and models.
2.1. The Formal Languages
To introduce the language of second-order propositional modal logic, we fix a set AP175
of atomic propositions and a finite set I of indices. Any language L built upon AP (using
connectives and modal operators) is said to be a language over AP .
Definition 1 (SOPML). The language Lsopml contains formulas ψ as defined by the
following BNF:
ψ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬ψ ∣ (ψ → ψ) ∣ ◻aψ ∣ ∀pψ
where p ∈ AP and a ∈ I.180
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For this language and those to be introduced shortly, we will omit parenthesis if doing
so causes no confusion. The language Lsopml contains modal formulas ◻aψ, for every
index a ∈ I. A general reading of this would be ‘according to the aspect or dimension a,
formula ψ holds’. The box can have more concrete interpretations, for instance dynamic
(after execution of program or action a, ψ holds), temporal or spatial (along dimensions a,185
ψ), or deontic (in all situations that abide to norm a, ψ is true). Indices may also denote
agents, in which case ◻aψ can represent attitudes that relate to goals (‘agent a desires ψ’,
or ‘has ψ as a goal’), that are intentional (agent a intends to achieve ψ), or informational
(‘agent a believes ψ’ or ‘a knows that ψ’). The latter, epistemic interpretation of ◻a will
obtain some special attention in this paper, and we will write Kaψ rather than ◻aψ.190
Further, the quantified formula ∀pψ informally says that ‘for all interpretations of
p, ψ obtains’. As usual, the quantifier ∃ is dual to ∀: ∃pψ ∶∶= ¬∀p¬ψ. Analogously, in
Lsopml , ◇aφ is a shorthand for ¬ ◻a ¬φ, and Ma is dual to Ka.
Hereafter we consider also the extension L∗sopml of Lsopml obtained by adding the
following clause: if ψ is a formula, then ◻∗ψ is also a formula. Instead of ◻∗ψ, in the195
epistemic interpretation we will write Cψ (it is common knowledge that ψ). To give
a hint of what this operator means in epistemic logic, define Eψ (everybody knows
that ψ) as ⋀a∈IKaψ. Then, formula Cψ intuitively captures the infinite conjunction
ψ ∧ Eψ ∧ EEψ ∧ EEEψ ∧ . . . (the usual definitions for ⊺,,∨,∧, and ↔ apply). To
sum up, whenever we consider the epistemic interpretation of modal operators, we write200
Ka and C, and define formulas ψ in the language L
∗
sopel of second-order propositional
epistemic logic (sopel) according to the following BNF:
ψ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬ψ ∣ (ψ → ψ) ∣Kaψ ∣ Cψ ∣ ∀pψ
for p ∈ AP and a ∈ I. Standard references for modal logic are [7, 9], while for epistemic
logic we refer to [20, 45].
We write sopml for the family of logics that are based on the languages Lsopml and205
L∗sopml . Throughout most of the paper, it is not very important whether we are consid-
ering a language with or without operator ◻∗ (see Definition 8 for its interpretation).
In the places where the difference between Lsopml and L
∗
sompl is important, we write
sopml∗ for the logic based on L∗sopml .
The name ‘second-order propositional modal (epistemic) logic’ is related to second-210
order quantification, as will become apparent in Section 3. In particular, this formalism
has been studied in relation to monadic second-order logic – mso, see [12, 36] and also
Section 3.
Example 2. To give a flavour of the expressivity of L∗sopml , we present some specifica-
tions written in this language. We use variants of ◻a in our notation: their meaning215
will be clear from the context. Using L∗sopml one can for instance express that agent a
believes that agent b always has some unfulfilled desires: Ba ◻
∗ ∃p(Dbp ∧ ¬p), where op-
erators Ba and Db are used to represent the doxastic and desire dimensions for agent a
and b respectively, whereas ◻∗ is interpreted on the reachability relation w.r.t. all agents’
moves.220
As a further example, formula (i) ∀p(◻ap → ◻bp) expresses, in a dynamic context,
that every result guaranteed by program a is also guaranteed by program b, or, provided
a doxastic interpretation of the box operator, agent b believes everything that agent a
believes. Deontically, the formula ∃p(Op ∧ ¬p) expresses that the current world is not
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ideal: there are facts that ought to hold, but they do not. Finally, the doxastic-epistemic225
formula (ii) Kb∃p(Bap∧¬p) intuitively expresses that agent b knows that agent a’s beliefs
are incorrect, while (iii) ∀p(Bap → p) ∧ ◻α∃q(Baq ∧ ¬q)) denotes that currently, agent
a’s beliefs are correct, but after executing program α, this ceases to be the case. We
remark that by using propositional quantification we can reason about general properties
of knowledge, e.g., truthfulness, inclusion, equivalence, of agents’ knowledge and beliefs,230
as in specifications (i), (ii), and (iii).
In this paper we consider various fragments of L∗sopml and Lsopml . To begin with, the
languages Lml of (propositional) modal logic and Lel of (propositional) epistemic logic
(L∗ml and L
∗
el , respectively) are obtained by removing clause ∀pψ from the definitions




sopel , respectively). Likewise, the language Lqbf of235
quantified boolean formulas omits clauses ◻aψ from Lsopml , while propositional logic Lpl
is defined in a standard way by considering only propositional connectives. Moreover,
the universal fragment L∗a−sopml of L
∗
sopml is defined by the following BNF:
ψ ∶∶= p ∣ ¬p ∣ (ψ ∧ ψ) ∣ (ψ ∨ ψ) ∣ ◻aψ ∣ ◻
∗ψ ∣ ∀pψ
Notice that in L∗a−sopml negation applies to atoms only. Hence, L
∗
a−sopml contains no
formula of the form ∃pψ, ◇aψ, or ◇
∗ψ. For convenience, we will also denote the set of240
atoms AP by Lap . A special role in this paper will be played by the languages Lx of sort
x, the set of sort symbols being {ap,pl ,ml , sopml}. We will shortly see that for each sort
x, the language Lx is linked to an interesting class of frames (defined in terms of types
y: see the paragraph above Definition 8). This connection is made precise in Lemma 11,
item 2. We summarise the main inclusions between languages in Figure 1. We observe245
that languages L∗x are defined only for x ∈ {ml , a − sopml, sopml}.
We now introduce some syntactic notions that will be used throughout the paper.
Hereafter we use ♯ as a placeholder for any unary operator ¬, ◻a, ◻
∗, and Q for any
quantifier ∀, ∃.
Definition 3 (Subformula and free atoms). The sets Sub(φ) and fr(φ), for the sub-250
formulas and free atoms of formula φ ∈ L∗sopml , respectively, are recursively defined as
follows:
Sub(p) = {p} fr(p) = {p}
Sub(♯φ) = {♯φ} ∪ Sub(φ) fr(♯φ) = fr(φ)
Sub(φ→ φ′) = {φ→ φ′} ∪ Sub(φ) ∪ Sub(φ′) fr(φ→ φ′) = fr(φ) ∪ fr(φ′)
Sub(∀pφ) = {∀pφ} ∪ Sub(φ) fr(∀pφ) = fr(φ) ∖ {p}
A sentence is a formula φ with an empty set of free atoms, i.e., fr(φ) = ∅. The set
bnd(φ) of bound atoms in φ is defined as usual as the set of all atoms q appearing in
the scope of any quantifier Qq. We assume that for each formula φ ∈ L∗sopml , fr(φ) and255
bnd(φ) are disjoint. Actually, we impose that each quantifier binds a different variable.
Both constraints can be enforced without loss of generality by renaming bound variables.
We now define when a formula ψ can substitute an atom p within a formula. In
particular, such a substitution should not create any new binding.
Definition 4 (Free for . . . ). Given an atom p ∈ fr(φ), a formula ψ is free for p in φ iff260
p does not appear in φ within the scope of any quantifier Qq for q ∈ fr(ψ). Alternatively,











Figure 1: Scheme of inclusions among the different languages.
for φ atomic, ψ is free for p in φ
for φ = ♯φ′, ψ is free for p in φ iff it is in φ′
for φ = φ′ → φ′′, ψ is free for p in φ iff it is in φ′ and φ′′
for φ = ∀qφ′, ψ is free for p in φ iff q ∉ fr(ψ) and ψ is free for p in φ′
We finally introduce a notion of substitution for free formulas.
Definition 5 (Substitution). Whenever ψ is free for p ∈ fr(φ), the substitution φ[p/ψ]





q for q different from p
ψ otherwise
(♯φ′)[p/ψ] = ♯(φ′[p/ψ])
(φ′ → φ′′)[p/ψ] = (φ′[p/ψ])→ (φ′′[p/ψ])
(∀rφ′)[p/ψ] = ∀r(φ′[p/ψ]), where r is assumed different from p as p ∈ fr(φ)
Intuitively, ψ being free for p in φ means that a substitution of p by ψ in φ does
not create any new binding. As an example, ¬q is free for p in ∃r(r → p) but not in
φ = ∃q(p ↔ q). After we have introduced our semantics, it will be clear that, while
∃q(p↔ q) is actually a validity, if we were to blindly substitute p with ¬q in φ, we would
obtain ∃q(¬q↔ q), which is tantamount to a contradiction. But note that, since ¬q is not270
free for p in φ, by Definition 5, φ[p/¬q] is not well-defined. Also note that the procedure
above does not guarantee that after a substitution a variable r only occurs in the scope
of a single quantifier Qr. For instance, ∀r(r → p)[p/∀r(q → r)] = ∀r(r → ∀r(q → r)).
However, reading the semantics, it will become clear that the latter formula is equivalent
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to ∀r(r → ∀s(q → s)): bounded variables can always be renamed (so that, in particular,275
every formula is equivalent to one in which every formula is bound at most once).
Example 6. As a further example of the expressive power of sopel, consider the fol-
lowing specification: agent b knows everything that a knows, and agent c knows this fact,
but d does not. This epistemic situation can be recast in Lsopel as the following formula:
∀p(Kap→Kbp) ∧Kc∀p(Kap→Kbp) ∧ ¬Kd∀p(Kap→Kbp)
In particular, we can reason further about agent d’s knowledge. Indeed, agent d might
know that a knows something ignored by b, without being able to explicitly point out the
content of a’s extra knowledge. This can be recast in Lsopel by the following formula:
Kd∃p(Kap ∧ ¬Kbp) (2)
However, d could actually know about a specific fact that a knows, but b ignores, as280
expressed in the following formula:
∃pKd(Kap ∧ ¬Kbp) (3)
We remark that (3) corresponds to the de re reading of our specification, while (2) is its
de dicto formalisation. Here we do not discuss in detail the de re/de dicto distinction, as
it is beyond the scope of the present contribution, and refer instead to the seminal paper
[46]. In particular, according to our semantics (to be introduced next), (3) is strictly285
stronger than (and entails) (2). Indeed, the implication (3) ⇒ (2) is a validity, but the
converse implication (2) ⇒ (3) does not hold in general. Thus, among other things,
sopel allows us to distinguish the two readings – de re and de dicto – of individual
knowledge.
2.2. Kripke Frames and Models290
To provide a meaning to formulas of second-order propositional modal logic, we con-
sider multi-modal Kripke frames and models, extended with a domain for the interpre-
tation of quantifiers.
Definition 7 (Kripke frame). A Kripke frame is a tuple F = ⟨W,D,R⟩ where
• W is a set of possible worlds;295
• D is the domain of propositions, i.e., a subset of 2W ;
• R ∶ I → 2W×W assigns a binary relation on W to each index in I.
As is common in propositional modal logic (pml), for every index a ∈ I, Ra is an
accessibility relation between worlds in W [7]. Differently from standard Kripke frames,
Definition 7 includes a set D ⊆ 2W of “admissible” propositions for the interpretation of300
atoms and quantifiers. Clearly, the Kripke frames in Definition 7 are related to general
frames [7, 44]. However, there are some notable differences. Firstly, in general frames the
domain D of propositions is a boolean algebra with operators, whereas no such assump-
tion is made in the present case. Secondly, the language interpreted on general frames is
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usually a plain modal logic, while here we address quantification as well. Indeed, propo-305
sitional quantification makes our language strictly more expressive than propositional
modal logic interpreted on general frames, as will become apparent later on (see for in-
stance Example 10 and recall that pml interpreted on general frames is as expressive as
pml interpreted on Kripke frames).
The accessibility relations can satisfy various properties, e.g., seriality, symmetry,310
transitivity, reflexivity, etc. When interpreting the language L∗sopel we assume that each
Ra is an equivalence relation (i.e., symmetric, transitive and reflexive), in line with the
epistemic reading of modal operators [45]. Finally, for each agent index a ∈ I and w ∈W ,
we let Ra(w) = {w
′ ∣ Ra(w,w′)}. If Ra is an equivalence relation, then Ra(w) is the
equivalence class of w according to Ra.315
To interpret formulas in L∗sopml on Kripke frames, we introduce assignments as func-
tions V ∶ AP →D. Also, for U ∈D, the assignment V pU assigns U to p and coincides with
V on all other atoms. Hence, atoms can only be assigned propositions in D ⊆ 2W . A
Kripke model over F is then defined as a pair M = ⟨F , V ⟩.
We now define the notion of satisfaction for formulas in L∗sopml .320
Definition 8 (Semantics). We define whether Kripke model M = ⟨F , V ⟩ satisfies for-
mula ϕ ∈ L∗sopml at world w, or (M,w) ⊧ ϕ, as follows:
(M,w) ⊧ p iff w ∈ V (p)
(M,w) ⊧ ¬ψ iff (M,w) /⊧ ψ
(M,w) ⊧ ψ → ψ′ iff (M,w) /⊧ ψ or (M,w) ⊧ ψ′
(M,w) ⊧ ◻aψ iff for all w
′ ∈ Ra(w), (M,w′) ⊧ ψ
(M,w) ⊧ ◻∗ψ iff for all w′ ∈ RC(w), (M,w′) ⊧ ψ
(M,w) ⊧ ∀pψ iff for all U ∈D, (MpU ,w) ⊧ ψ
where RC = (⋃a∈I Ra)∗ is the reflexive transitive closure of ⋃a∈I Ra, and M
p
U = ⟨F , V
p
U ⟩.
Given Definition 8, we say that ◻a is the necessity operator for Ra and that ◻
∗ is
the necessity operator for the transitive reflexive closure of ⋃a∈I Ra. By the definition, a325
quantified formula ∀pψ (respectively, ∃pψ) is true at world w iff for every (respectively,
some) assignment of propositions in D to atom p, ψ is true. Further, as is the case for
the common knowledge operator C, (M,w) ⊧ ◻∗ψ iff (M,w′) ⊧ ψ for every world w′
reachable from w, i.e., for every w′ such that for some sequence w0, . . . ,wk of worlds,
(i) w0 = w, (ii) wk = w
′, and (iii) for every i < k, wi = wi+1 or Ra(wi,wi+1) for some330
a ∈ I. Hence, in non-epistemic contexts, ◻∗ can be interpreted as a reachability operator,
analogous to the common knowledge operator C.
The satisfaction set ⟦ϕ⟧M of formula ϕ in model M is defined as {w ∈W ∣ (M,w) ⊧
ϕ}. We omit the subscript M whenever clear by the context. We now introduce var-
ious notions of truth and validity. First, we write (F , V,w) ⊧ φ as a shorthand for335
(⟨F , V ⟩,w) ⊧ φ. Then, we say that φ is true at w, or (F ,w) ⊧ φ, iff (F , V,w) ⊧ φ for
every assignment V ; φ is valid in a frame F , or F ⊧ φ, iff (F ,w) ⊧ φ for every world w
in F ; φ is valid in a class K of frames, or K ⊧ φ, iff F ⊧ φ for every F ∈ K. Also, φ is
true in a model M, or M ⊧ φ, iff (M,w) ⊧ φ for every world w. Finally, φ is satisfiable
iff for some model M and world w, (M,w) ⊧ φ.340
In the rest of the paper we consider specific classes of Kripke frames and models,
which feature pre-eminently in the literature on sopml [21, 44]. To introduce them,
10
we first define operators [a] ∶ 2W → 2W , for every a ∈ I, such that [a](U) = {w ∈
W ∣ Ra(w) ⊆ U} while operator [ ]
∗ ∶ 2W → 2W is introduced so that [ ]∗(U) = {w ∈
W ∣ for every n ∈ N, for every sequence w0, . . . ,wn, if w0 = w and for every i < n,wi =345
wi+1 or Ra(wi,wi+1) for some a ∈ I, then wn ∈ U}. Notice that for RC defined as the
reflexive transitive closure of ∪a∈IRa, we have [C](U) = {w ∈W ∣ RC(w) ⊆ U} = [ ]∗(U).
Definition 9. A Kripke frame F is
boolean iff D is a boolean algebra, i.e., it is closed under intersection, union
and complement
modal iff D is a boolean algebra closed under operators [a], for every a ∈ I,
and [ ]∗
full iff D = 2W
350
A Kripke model M = ⟨F , V ⟩ is boolean (modal, full, respectively) whenever the un-
derlying frame F is. We distinguish the class Kall of all Kripke frames, the class Kbool
of all boolean frames, the class Kmodal of all modal frames, and the class Kfull of all full
frames. Observe that, by using an analogy with monadic second-order logic, the class of
full frames corresponds to the basic interpretation of sopml, where any frame is uniquely355
identified by fixing the set W of worlds and accessibility relations, as the domain D is
equal to 2W . On the other hand, the other classes of frames are related to the Henkin
interpretation of mso, where D can be a possibly strict subset of 2W (cf. [51]). Hereafter,
we often refer to Kall -, Kbool -, and Kmodal -frames as non-full frames, even though they
do contain full frames.360
Furthermore, within each of the classes in Definition 9, we will consider further con-
ditions on the accessibility relations Ra: reflexivity r, transitivity t, and symmetry s.
Hereafter, given type y ∈ Y = {all , bool ,modal , full} and subset τ ⊆ {r, t, s}, Kτy denotes
the corresponding class of frames satisfying the properties in τ . For simplicity, Key denotes
class K
{r,t,s}
y (which we also write as K
rts
y ) of frames in which all accessibility relations365
are equivalences, that is, the class of epistemic frames for the interpretation of sopel.
We define a function ̂∶ X → Y from language sort symbols to type symbols as follows:
âp = all ; p̂l = bool ; m̂l = modal ; and ŝopml = full . In total, we obtain 32 classes Kτy of
frames. However, we only consider 20 of them: the subsets τ ⊆ {r, t, s} corresponding
to the 5 normal modalities K, T, S4, B, and S5, combined with the 4 types all , bool ,370
modal , and full . Further classes of frames could be introduced, for instance the class
where every formula in L∗sopml defines a proposition in D. However, such a class is not
directly relevant for the results below and its introduction requires a non-trivial general-
isation of Kripke frames [44]. Thus, such extensions are beyond the scope of the present
paper.375
Observe that if we define Th(K) = {φ ∈ L∗sopml ∣ K ⊧ φ}, then clearly
Th(Kall) ⊆ Th(Kbool) ⊆ Th(Kmodal) ⊆ Th(Kfull) (4)
In Section 4.1 we show that these inclusions are strict, but first we illustrate some
applications of sopel in reasoning about knowledge.
Example 10. To assess the expressivity of sopel in knowledge representation, we con-
trast it with comparative epistemic logic – cel [18]. cel extends propositional modal
11
logic with formulas a ≽ b, the intuitive interpretation of which is: agent b knows at least380
as much as agent a. Semantically, the clause for satisfaction of such formulas at world
w in model M is given as
(M,w) ⊧ a ≽ b iff Ra(w) ⊇ Rb(w) (5)
In this sense a ≽ b also expresses a local property of frame F , namely the inclusion
Rb(w) ⊆ Ra(w).
We show that the comparison between agent a’s and agent b’s knowledge can be recast
in sopel as
∀p(Kap→Kbp) (6)
In particular, the RHS of (5) is tantamount to the satisfaction of (6) at w, whenever385
model M is full. More precisely, for an arbitrary model M we have
(M,w) ⊧ a ≽ b ⇒ (M,w) ⊧ ∀p(Kap→Kbp)
The converse also holds for fullM, but has counterexamples in the classes of boolean and
modal models. As a result, formulas a ≽ b and (6) have the same meaning in the class of
full models, and therefore cel can indeed be mimicked in sopel. We discuss this fact in
more detail in Section 3.390
Moreover, in sopel we can make distinctions that are not expressible in epistemic
logic. Related to Example 2, in Lsopel we can state that b knows that a’s beliefs are not
truthful by using formula
Kb∃p(Bap ∧ ¬p) (7)
Notice that (7) expresses that b knows that there exists some fact believed by a, which
is false, possibly without being able to explicitly point out the actual content of a’s false395
belief. On the other hand, it could be the case that for some proposition p, agent b knows
that a wrongly believes it, as expressed in the following:
∃pKb(Bap ∧ ¬p) (8)
The formula displayed at (7) is usually referred to as a de dicto reading of the state-
ment above, where quantifier ∃p appears within the scope of modal operator Ka, while
(8) corresponds to the de re reading of the same statement, in which ∃p appears outside400
the scope of Ka (we refer the interested reader in the two different readings to [46]). We
remark that (7) and (8) are not equivalent in general, (8) being strictly stronger than
(7). Specifically, to account for the difference between (7) and (8), consider frame G in
Fig. 2(a), where the W - and R-components are as depicted, and D = {{w} ∣ w ∈ W}.
Clearly, (G, V,w1) ⊧ Bap ∧ ¬p for V (p) = {u1}, and similarly (G, V
′,w2) ⊧ Bap ∧ ¬p for405
V ′(p) = {u2}. Hence, (G,w) ⊧ (7) for w ∈ {w1,w2}. On the other hand, for no U ∈ D,
(G, V pU ,w) ⊧ Bap ∧ ¬p. Therefore, (G,w) /⊧ (8) for w ∈ {w1,w2}. Finally, we observe
that ∃pKaφ → Ka∃pφ is a validity in every class of frames. As a result, in sopel (8)
is strictly stronger than (7), and we can distinguish the de dicto and de re readings of
agent b’s higher-level knowledge.410
Finally, consider frame G′ in Fig. 2(b) with D′ = {{w′} ∣ w′ ∈W ′}. Let M and M′ be
















Figure 2: Frames G and G′ in Example 10.
the same atoms true in w1, w2, and w
′, and similarly for u1, u2 and u′. One can check
that (M′,w′) ⊧ (8) (and (7) as well). However, (M,w2) and (M′,w′), satisfy the same
formulas in Lml (indeed, the two models are bisimilar), implying that the de re formula415
(8) cannot be expressed in pml. We return to this example in Section 5.
2.3. Preliminary Results
In this section we prove some preliminary results on the model-theory of second-order
propositional modal logic, that will be frequently used in the rest of the paper. To start
with, in Lemma 11 we extend some basic but useful results in the theory of quantification.420
In particular, in first-order logic item 1 of Lemma 11 is known as the coincidence lemma,
and item 2b as the substitution lemma (cf. [19]).
Lemma 11.
1. Let φ be a formula in L∗sopml and F a frame in Kall . If assignments V and V
′
coincide on fr(φ), then425
(F , V,w) ⊧ φ iff (F , V ′,w) ⊧ φ
2. Recall that X = {ap,pl ,ml , sopml} and ̂= {(ap,all), (pl , bool), (ml ,modal), (sopml ,
full)}. Let x ∈X. Then,
(a) For every ψ ∈ L∗x and model M over F ∈ Kx̂, we have ⟦ψ⟧M ∈D.
(b) If F ∈ Kx̂ and ψ ∈ L
∗
x is free for p in φ, then
(F , V p⟦ψ⟧⟨F,V ⟩ ,w) ⊧ φ iff (F , V,w) ⊧ φ[p/ψ]
The proof of this lemma is immediate, so we include it only in the appendix. These430
results show that quantification in sopml is “well-behaved”: by item 1 of Lemma 11,
models built over the same frame and agreeing on the interpretation of free atoms, satisfy
the same formulas. It follows in particular that a sentence φ is either satisfied by any
assignment or none, that is, (F ,w) ⊧ φ iff for every model M over F , (M,w) ⊧ φ, iff
for some model M over F , (M,w) ⊧ φ. As a consequence of Lemma 11, item 2a, the435
domain of quantification in a model includes the set of denotations of formulas in that
model, according to the various fragments of L∗sopml . Moreover, by Lemma 11, item 2b,
the syntactic operation of substitution φ[p/ψ] corresponds to the semantic notion of
reinterpretation Mp⟦ψ⟧.
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In Section 4 we will make use of generated submodels, a concept that is commonly440
used in modal logic.
Definition 12 (Generated Submodel). Given model M = ⟨W,D,R,V ⟩ and world
w ∈W , the submodel generated by w is the model Mw = ⟨Ww,Dw,Rw, Vw⟩ such that
• Ww is the set of worlds reachable from w, i.e., Ww = (⋃a∈I Ra)∗(w);
• Dw = {Uw ⊆Ww ∣ Uw = U ∩Ww for some U ∈D};445
• for every a ∈ I, Rw,a = Ra ∩W 2w;
• for every p ∈ AP , Vw(p) = V (p) ∩Ww.
The subframe generated by w is then defined as Fw = ⟨Ww,Dw,Rw⟩. The relevant
property of a generated submodelMw is that (M,w) ⊧ ◻
∗φ if and only if (Mw,w′) ⊧ φ
for every w′ ∈Ww. It is also important to note that if M is full, modal or boolean, then450
so is Mw.
Proposition 13. For y ∈ {all , bool ,modal , full} and τ ⊆ {r, t, s}, if a frame F belongs to
Kτy then also Fw ∈ K
τ
y .
The proof is immediate, so we omit it.
2.3.1. Model Checking455
In order to explore the computational properties of sopml, we consider the complexity
of its model checking problem. Then, in the next section we analyse the (lack of) finite
model property for sopml. Before we can determine – or even define – the complexity
of model checking, however, we first need to define the size of formulas and models. Our
definition of the former is entirely as usual.460
Definition 14 (Formula Size). Let φ ∈ L∗sopml be a formula. The size of φ, denoted
∣φ∣, is given recursively by: ∣p∣ = 1, ∣ψ1 → ψ2∣ = ∣ψ1∣ + ∣ψ2∣ + 1, and ∣ ♯ψ∣ = ∣∀pψ∣ = ∣ψ∣ + 1.
Similarly, the size of a model M can be defined in a straightforward way.
Definition 15 (Model Size). The size ∣M∣ of model M = ⟨W,D,R,V ⟩ is given by
∣M∣ = ∣W ∣ + ∣D∣ +∑a∈I ∣Ra∣ +∑p∈AP ∣V (p)∣.465
A model M is finite if ∣M∣ <∞.
Now that we have defined the sizes of formulas and models, we can define the model
checking problem and determine its complexity.
Definition 16 (Model Checking for SOPML). Given a formula φ ∈ L∗sopml , a finite
model M and a world w of M, the model checking problem for sopml is to determine470
whether (M,w) ⊧ φ.
Then, we are able to prove the following complexity result.
Theorem 17 (Model Checking Complexity). The model checking problem for sopml
is PSPACE-complete with respect to ∣φ∣ + ∣M∣.
14
Proof. As regards hardness, we reduce satisfiability of quantified boolean for-475
mulas to sopml model checking. Given a formula φ ∈ Lqbf , consider the frame F =
⟨{w}, (w,w),{{w},∅}⟩ and an arbitrary assignment V , and define M = ⟨F , V ⟩. Then,
we have that φ is satisfiable iff (M,w) ⊧ ∃p⃗φ, where p⃗ are all the atoms in φ. Because
the satisfiability problem for quantified boolean formulas is PSPACE-hard, it follows that
model checking sopml is PSPACE-hard as well.480
As regards being in PSPACE, an algorithm in PSPACE for model checking sopml
is shown as Algorithm 1.1 It is based on standard model checking algorithms for modal
logic [8], which run in polynomial time. The difference between these standard algorithms
for modal logic and Algorithm 1 is that we need an extra case for the ∀p operator. This
extra case is why Algorithm 1 takes polynomial space as opposed to polynomial time.485
Algorithm 1 recursively calls itself. The depth of this recursion is bounded by ∣φ∣.
Furthermore, at each stage we need to keep only one of these recursive calls in memory
at a time. For example, in the ∀pψ step, if U,U ′ ∈ D we can first compute X ∩ ⟦ψ⟧Mp
U





follows that the space requirement of Algorithm 1 is polynomial with respect to ∣φ∣+ ∣M∣.490





return W ∖ ⟦ψ⟧M;
case ψ ∧ ψ′:
return ⟦ψ⟧M ∩ ⟦ψ′⟧M;
case ◻aψ:
return {w ∈W ∣ Ra(w) ⊆ ⟦ψ⟧M};
case ◻∗ψ:
return {w ∈W ∣ (⋃a∈AgRa)∗(w) ⊆ ⟦ψ⟧M};
case ∀pψ:
initialise X =W
for U ∈D do




As a result, model checking sopml is no more computationally complex than the
corresponding problem for quantified boolean formulas. Thus, the enhanced expressive-
ness comes at no extra computational cost, when compared with qbf. With respect
to propositional modal logic, the complexity increases from PTIME to PSPACE. How-495
ever, this is something to be expected given the extra expressive power of propositional
quantification.
1Strictly speaking, the algorithm computes ⟦φ⟧M, but we can easily determine whether M,w ⊧ φ
from that.
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We should also note that the complexity of the model checking problem depends more
strongly on ∣φ∣ than on ∣M∣. The recursion in Algorithm 1 can be seen as a tree with
depth bounded by ∣φ∣ and branching factor bounded by ∣M∣. So the algorithm is called at500
most ∣M∣∣φ∣ times. As a result, while the space complexity of the algorithm is polynomial
in both ∣φ∣ and ∣M∣, its time complexity is exponential in ∣φ∣ and polynomial in ∣M∣.
Furthermore, we can obtain the same PSPACE result when using a more concise
representation ofM. So far, we have defined the size ofM as ∣M∣ = ∣W ∣+ ∣D∣+∑a∈I ∣Ra∣+
∑p∈AP ∣V (p)∣. This means that, among other things, we simply count the number of505
elements in D as one of the components of M. So, in effect, we are treating D as
a list. In some cases, however, there are other natural representations of D that are
much more concise. Suppose, for example, that M has a full domain, so D = 2W .
Then instead of representing D as a list of sets we could represent it symbolically as
2W . More generally, we can assume that D is given by some membership function f , so510
D = {Y ⊆ W ∣ f(Y,W )}. The only requirement we place upon it is that f should not
be too hard to compute; we assume that determining whether f(Y,W ) can be done in
polynomial space with respect to ∣W ∣.
Then the model checking problem for sopml is PSPACE-complete not just in ∣φ∣+∣M∣
but also in ∣φ∣ + ∣W ∣ + ∣R∣ + ∣V ∣, which can be exponentially smaller. With regard to515
hardness, note that the hardness part of the proof of Theorem 17 uses a fixed model, so
in that regard the definition of model size is irrelevant. It follows that the model checking
problem is also PSPACE-hard with respect to ∣φ∣ + ∣W ∣ + ∣R∣ + ∣V ∣. With regard to being
in PSPACE, a slight modification to Algorithm 1 suffices. Suppose that we replace the
∀pψ case of that algorithm with520
case ∀pψ:
initialise X =W
for U ∈ 2W do
if U ∈D then






The proof that this amended algorithm runs in PSPACE with respect to ∣φ∣+∣W ∣+∣R∣+∣V ∣
can be done in the same way as the proof of Theorem 17, so we omit it here.530
2.3.2. Finite Model Property
We now briefly argue why sopml does not have the final model property. Consider
the following set of formulas:
Γ = {◇a⊺,◻a◇a ⊺,∀p(◻ap→ ◻a ◻a p),◻a∃p(p ∧ ◻a¬p)}
Now suppose that Γ holds at some pointed model (M,w). Then the first two formulas
of Γ require Ra to be serial on {w} ∪ Ra(w), and the third enforces transitivity of Ra
(also at w). Finally, if world w satisfies ◻a∃p(p ∧ ◻a¬p), then, by Example 24 item 1,
we know that ¬Ra(v, v) for all v ∈ Ra(w), which implies that ¬Ra(w,w), so that Ra535
is irreflexive over {w} ∪ Ra(w). But it is easy to verify that a transitive, serial, and
irreflexive relation on Ra(w) requires Ra(w) to be infinite. In other words, we found a
finite set Γ of formulas in sopml that only has infinite models.
16
Theorem 18. The logic sopml does not have the finite model property.
Theorem 18 is a generalisation of a result presented in [40, Section 3]. As the name of540
that section (‘SOPMLE = MSO’) suggests, it demonstrates that sopmle, which is sopml
with a universal modality, has the same expressive power as mso. And obviously, mso
can force a model to be infinite (use the relational properties of our example above), and
therefore sopmle can. Note that in our example, we don’t assume a universal modality
in our language, though.545
3. Local Properties in Modal Logic
In the introduction we discussed the difference between a global property as expressed
by the modal schema (i) ◻aϕ→ ϕ, whose validity entails that the accessibility relation in
a given frame is reflexive, and a local property such as the one represented by the sopml
formula ∀p(◻ap→ p) that, as we shall see, on full frames holds exactly in reflexive worlds.550
Along this line, in [16, 17, 18] a sophisticated account was put forward to express local
properties, by adding dedicated modal operators to a basic propositional modal logic.
To present the language of local properties in modal logic, or lpml, to compare the two
approaches, and more generally to discuss the expressive power of sopml, we consider a
monadic second-order logic and a first-order fragment interpreted on Kripke frames.555
Given a frame F = ⟨W,D,R⟩ and a set AP of atoms, we define an mso alphabet
containing binary predicate constants Ra for every agent index a ∈ I, a unary predicate
variable P for every atom p ∈ AP , and a set X of individual variables. Then, mso
formulas Θ in Lmso are defined in BNF as follows:
Θ ∶∶= P (x) ∣ x = y ∣ Ra(x, y) ∣ ¬Θ ∣ Θ→ Θ ∣ ∀xΘ ∣ ∀PΘ
where a ∈ I and x, y ∈ X .560
We also consider the first-order fragment Lfo of mso obtain by removing clause ∀PΘ
from the BNF above. This is indeed the first-order language considered in [18]. Moreover,
we denote as L1fo the fragment of Lfo containing formulas with at most one free individual
variable. This fragment is well-known to be rich enough to express properties of frames
such as reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity (note that more than one variable is needed565
for e.g. transitivity, but at most one is free).
As regards the interpretation of mso and fo (First-Order) formulas, an assignment
ρ now is a function associating a world w ∈W to every individual variable x, and a set
U ∈ D to every predicate variable P . For w ∈W and U ∈ D, the variants ρxw and ρ
P
U are
defined similarly to sopml.570
Definition 19 (Semantics of MSO). We define whether frame F = ⟨W,D,R⟩ satis-
fies formula Θ ∈ Lmso for an assignment ρ, or (F , ρ) ⊧ Θ, as follows:
(F , ρ) ⊧ P (x) iff ρ(x) ∈ ρ(P )
(F , ρ) ⊧ x = y iff ρ(x) = ρ(y)
(F , ρ) ⊧ Ra(x, y) iff Ra(ρ(x), ρ(y))
(F , ρ) ⊧ ¬Θ iff (F , ρ) /⊧ Θ
(F , ρ) ⊧ Θ→ Θ′ iff (F , ρ) /⊧ Θ or (F , ρ) ⊧ Θ′
(F , ρ) ⊧ ∀xΘ iff for all w ∈W , (F , ρxw) ⊧ Θ
(F , ρ) ⊧ ∀PΘ iff for all U ∈D, (F , ρPU) ⊧ Θ
17
Obviously Definition 19 induces an interpretation of formulas in Lfo as well. In
particular, for a formula Θ(x) ∈ L1fo , we write (F ,w) ⊧ Θ to denote that (F , ρ) ⊧ Θ for
ρ(x) = w, and F ⊧ Θ if (F ,w) ⊧ Θ for all w ∈ W . The different interpretation of the575
satisfaction relation ⊧ for sopml and mso respectively will be clear from the context.
Note that the transitive closure R∗ of R can be easily defined in mso.
We illustrate the relationship between second-order propositional modal logic and
monadic second-order logic (mso) through translation ST that extends the standard
translation between modal and first-order logic [7]:580
STx(p) = P (x)
STx(¬φ) = ¬STx(φ)
STx(φ→ φ
′) = STx(φ)→ STx(φ′)
STx(◻aφ) = ∀y(Ra(x, y)→ STy(φ))
STx(◻
∗φ) = ∀y(R∗(x, y)→ STy(φ))
STx(∀pφ) = ∀P (STx(φ))
Clearly, for every formula φ ∈ L∗sopml , STx(φ) ∈ Lmso is a formula where x is the
only free individual variable. If ψ ∈ Lml is a purely propositional modal formula, then
STx(ψ) ∈ Lfo is a first-order formula, as obtained via the standard translation. In
particular, STx(ψ) belongs to L
1
fo .
We now get the following preservation result for the standard translation, that will585
be used in the completeness proof.
Lemma 20. For every model M = ⟨F , V ⟩, world w ∈W , and formula ψ ∈ L∗sopml ,
(M,w) ⊧ ψ iff (F , ρ) ⊧ STx(ψ)
whenever ρ(x) = w and ρ(Pi) = V (pi).
The proof is mostly standard, and can be found in Appendix A. As a consequence
of Lemma 20, there is a one-to-one correspondence between formulas in sopml and their590
standard translations in mso in the following sense: a frame F validates the universal
closure ∀p⃗ψ of a formula ψ ∈ L∗sopml iff property ∀P⃗STx(ψ) ∈ Lmso holds in F , where P⃗
are all the unary predicates appearing in STx(ψ).
We now briefly recall some basic modal theory on local definability: we refer the
interested reader to [7, 9] for further details. We use θ (or θ(a⃗, p⃗) to emphasise sequences595
a⃗ of indices and p⃗ of atoms) for formulas in Lml . Likewise, we use Θ ∈ L
1
fo for first-order
formulas with at most one free variable interpreted over states (or Θ(a⃗, x) to denote that
Θ mentions a⃗ as indices and has x as the free variable).
Definition 21. Let θ ∈ Lml and Θ ∈ L
1
fo,
1. θ defines frame property Θ iff for all frames F , F ⊧ θ iff F ⊧ Θ.600
2. θ locally defines Θ iff for all F and all w ∈ F , (F ,w) ⊧ θ iff (F ,w) ⊧ Θ.
As examples of Definition 21, consider the well-known schemes T ◻aϕ→ ϕ, 4 ◻aϕ→
◻a◻aϕ, and B ϕ→ ◻a◇aϕ, that (locally) define the properties of reflexivity, transitivity,
and symmetry on frames. Furthermore, by Lemma 20 it is clear that every θ ∈ Lml




In the theory of pml, when formula θ locally defines Θ and some other mild conditions
hold, one obtains the following connection between axiomatisation and completeness: if
an axiomatisation Ax is complete for a class K of frames, then Ax + θ is complete for
class {F ∈ K ∣ F ⊧ ∀xΘ} of frames satisfying condition Θ. So for instance, taking
the basic modal logic K, which is sound and complete with respect to the class K of610
all frames, the logic K + T is sound and complete with respect to class {F ∈ K ∣ F ⊧
∀xRa(x,x) for all a ∈ I}, that is, the class of reflexive frames. As further examples,
whereas S5 = K +T + 4 +B is sound and complete with respect to class S5 = {F ∈ K ∣
for all a ∈ I,Ra is an equivalence relation}, the logic S5+{◻bϕ→ ◻cϕ ∣ b, c ∈ I} is sound
and complete with respect to {F ∈ S5 ∣ F ⊧ ∀x(Rc(x) ⊆ Rb(x)) for all b, c ∈ I}.615
This is an appealing modular feature of modal logic. Yet, as also remarked by van
Ditmarsch et al. ([16, 17, 18]) this can only be applied if one adds formula θ as a global
property: assuming θ as an axiom implies that it becomes a validity. For instance, adding
formula Baϕ→ ϕ to an axiom system, in order to model that agent a’s beliefs are correct,
implies that in the resulting logic, it is common knowledge that a’s beliefs are correct,620
and this fact will always remain true.
To compare our approach based on sopml to van Ditmarsch et al.’s lpml, we first
provide a brief account of the latter.
3.1. Local properties and lpml
This section on lpml is based on [16, 17, 18]: we refer the reader to these references for625
a more extensive exposition. The term ‘logic’ is maybe not appropriate for lpml; rather,
it is a specific approach to ‘connect’, in a modal object language, a modal formula θ ∈ Lml
and a first-order property Θ ∈ L1fo through the introduction of a relational atom ⊡ (or
⊡(a⃗)), in such a way that on Kripke models ⊡ is interpreted as Θ locally. More precisely,
the language of lpml extends Lml with formulas of type ⊡(a⃗), whose interpretation is630
provided by an associated formula Θ⊡(a⃗, x) ∈ L1fo , according to the following satisfaction
clause:
(M,w) ⊧ ⊡(a⃗) iff (F ,w) ⊧ Θ⊡(a⃗, x) (9)
By clause (9) we say that formula ⊡(a⃗) expresses locally first-order property Θ⊡ (at
w).
Then, lpml investigates how operator ⊡ can help us, in the object language, to build635
a bridge between modal formulas θ⊡ and first-order properties Θ⊡ that θ⊡ locally defines.
So, for instance, we can have ⊡(a) = Refl(a) for Θ⊡(a, x) = Ra(x,x), or ⊡(b, c) = Sup(b, c)
for Θ⊡(b, c, x) = ∀y(Rc(x, y)→ Rb(x, y)) (for more examples, see Table 1).
Recalling that operator ⊡ is part of the object language of lpml, [18] then adds to the
basic modal logic K, for specific formulas θ⊡ ∈ Lml , an axiom Ax⊡ and an inference rule640
R⊡. Further, [18, Theorem 2] provides a sufficient condition on the relationship between
θ⊡,⊡ and Θ⊡, called local harmony, under which K+Ax⊡ +R⊡ is a sound and complete
axiomatisation for the class of models that satisfy Θ⊡.
Definition 22 (Local Harmony). Formulas θ(a⃗, p⃗) ∈ Lml , Θ(a⃗, x) ∈ L
1
fo, and ⊡(a⃗) in
lpml are in local harmony iff (i) θ (locally) defines Θ, and (ii) ⊡ expresses Θ locally.645
A model M for lpml is a tuple ⟨W,R, I, V ⟩ where W,R and V are as for pml and I
assigns a first order property to each relational atom ⊡. We follow [18] in assuming that
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θ(a⃗, p⃗) Θ(a⃗, x) ⊡(a⃗)
◻ap→ ◻bp ∀y(Rb(x, y)→ Ra(x, y)) Sup(a, b)
◻cp→ ◻a ◻b p ∀y, z(Ra(x, y) ∧Rb(y, z)→ Rc(x, z)) Trans(a, b, c)
¬ ◻a  ∃yRa(x, y) Ser(a)
◻ap→ p Ra(x, x) Refl(a)
¬ ◻a p→ ◻b¬ ◻c p ∀y, z(Ra(x, y) ∧Rb(x, z)→ Rc(y, z)) Eucl(a, b, c)
¬ ◻a p→ ¬ ◻b ◻cp ∀z(Ra(x, z)→ ∃yRb(x, y) ∧Rc(y, z)) Dens(a, b, c)
(¬ ◻a p ∧ ¬ ◻b q)→ ¬ ◻c (p ∨ q) ∀y, z((Ra(x, y) ∧Rb(x, z))→ (y = z ∧Rc(x, y))) Func(a, b, c)
Table 1: as in [18, Table 1], Θ(a⃗, x) is a property of state x, and ⊡(a⃗) is a name in the object language
such that ⊡(a⃗) holds at w iff Θ(a⃗, x) holds in M for ρ(x) = w.
for each symbol ⊡θ(a⃗), there is a Lml -formula θ(a⃗, p⃗) and a L
1
fo-formula Θ(a⃗, x) such
that the three are in local harmony and I(⊡θ(a⃗)) = Θ(a⃗, x). To be explicit about this,
we call such a model M an intended model for lpml.650
One could say that lpml as a language can express every formula in L1fo , as there
are no restrictions, in the object language, on the relational atoms ⊡ that can be added
to standard pml (i.e., Table 1 can in principle be extended with an atom ⊡(a⃗) for any
property Θ(a⃗, x)). However, the aim of lpml is not to express arbitrary first-order
properties Θ, but to reason locally about properties like truthfulness of agent a’s beliefs,655
or an agent c knowing more than b. In particular, there has to exists a modal formula
θ that (locally) defines Θ, that is, Θ has to be equivalent to ∀P⃗STx(θ). lpml expresses
such first-order properties by adding atoms like Refl(a) and Sup(b, c), respectively. We
reckon that sopml, allowing for quantification over propositions as in ∀p(Bap → p) and
∀p(Kbp → Kap), is an alternative way to study local properties which is at least as660
natural as lpml and provably as expressive, in a sense we explain below.
3.2. Local properties, lpml and sopml on full frames
We first compare lpml to sopml on full frames. On the other classes of frames there
are some notable differences that we discuss in Section 3.3. Here we show that if formulas
Θ⊡(a⃗, x) and θ⊡(a⃗, p⃗) are in local harmony with some atom ⊡(a⃗), then formula ⊡(a⃗) is
equivalent to ∀p⃗θ(a⃗, p⃗) ∈ L∗sopml , within the class of full frames. Hence, sopml is at least
as expressive as lpml. To make this more precise, note that lpml is only able to reason
about local properties if all triples θ(a⃗, p⃗), ⊡(a⃗), and Θ(a⃗) are in local harmony. Recall
that a lpml model M that guarantees this is an intended model. We will also interpret
such an intended modelM as a model for sopml: one just discards the lpml information
connecting ⊡(a⃗) and Θ⊡(a⃗, x), and then adds the constraint that the model is full. Now,
consider the translation t from lpml formulas to sopml formulas that distributes over
all connectives and modal operators, and moreover says
t(⊡(a⃗)) = ∀p⃗θ(a⃗, p⃗)
We then obtain the following equivalence result.
Theorem 23. For every intended lpml model M, w ∈M, and formula ϕ in lpml, we
have665
(M,w) ⊧ ϕ iff (M,w) ⊧ t(ϕ)
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A proof of Theorem 23 is given in Appendix A. This theorem implies, in a sense, that
what can be done in lpml, can also be done in sopml: if θ(a⃗, p⃗), ⊡(a⃗) and Θ(a⃗) are in
local harmony, then, to reason locally about a scheme θ, one can either use the universal
closure ∀p⃗θ in sopml, or atom ⊡(a⃗) in lpml. The result also suggests ways in which
sopml may be more appropriate to reason about local properties, namely cases where Θ670
is not locally defined by any formula θ ∈ Lml (i.e., there is no θ such that ∀P⃗STx(θ) is
equivalent to Θ), or, conversely, when θ does not define a first-order property Θ locally
(i.e., there is no Θ such that ∀P⃗STx(θ) is equivalent to Θ). Hereafter we consider some
similar cases.
Example 24. Consider the following first-order formulas:675
• Θ1 = ¬Ra(x,x) (irreflexivity)
• Θ2 = ∃x1, . . . , xn⋀i≤n(Ra(x,xi) ∧⋀i≠j≤n xi ≠ xj) (having at least n a-successors)
• Θ3 = ∀y((Ra(x, y) ∧Ra(y, x))→ x = y) (anti-symmetry)
• Θ4 = ∀y(Rb(x, y)→ ¬Ra(x, y)) (Ra and Rb have empty intersection)
• Θ5 = ∀y((Ra(x, y)∧Rb(x, y))→ Rc(x, y)) (Rc contains the intersection of Ra and680
Rb).
It is well-known that these first-order properties are not definable in modal logic [7, 9].
However, consider the following formulas in sopml:
• ϕ1 = ∃p(◻ap ∧ ¬p)
• ϕ2 = ∃p1, . . . , pn(⋀i≤n◇a(pi ∧⋀j≤n,j≠i ¬pj))685
• ϕ3 = ∃p(p ∧ ∀q(◇a(q ∧◇ap)→ q))
• ϕ4 = ∃p(◻ap ∧ ◻b¬p)
• ϕ5 = ∀p(◻cp→ ∃q(◻aq ∧ ◻b(q → p)))
which are such that each ϕi locally defines Θi (1 ≤ i ≤ 5). We formalise this result in the
following lemma.690
Lemma 25. Consider formulas ϕi ∈ Lsopml and Θi ∈ L
1
fo in Example 24, for i = 1, . . . ,5.
Let x be the only free variable in Θi and assume ρ(x) = w. Assume F is a full frame,
then,
(F ,w) ⊧ ϕi iff (F , ρ) ⊧ Θi
The proof of some items of the lemma is to be found in Appendix A. In particular,
sopml can express properties that are not definable in standard modal logic.695
Example 26. [Distributed Knowledge] To come back to an example from epistemic logic,
an interesting notion in collective knowledge is that of distributed knowledge Dϕ. The
intuition here is that distributed knowledge is the knowledge of a ‘wise man’ (cf. [20])
with whom all agents have shared their knowledge. The typical example is a situation
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where, for instance, one agent knows ϕ, another knows that ϕ→ ψ, implying distributed
knowledge of ψ. A more concrete example goes as follows: it is distributed knowledge in
every group of agents (provided everybody knows their own birthday) whether two agents
share their birthday. The notion of distributed knowledge Dϕ for n agents has an ax-
iomatisation that is sound and complete with respect to models where the corresponding
relation RD is the intersection of all the individual agents’ accessibility relations. How-
ever, intersection is not locally definable in modal logic (for more on modal properties of
distributed knowledge, or implicit knowledge as it is sometimes called, see for instance
[30, 47]). However, in sopml, using Example 24.5 we can express that agent c knows
exactly what the distributed knowledge of agents a and b is:
∀p(Kap→Kcp) ∧ ∀p(Kbp→Kcp) ∧ ∀p(Kcp→ ∃q(Kaq ∧Kb(q → p))) (10)
Notice that (10) uses exactly the idea of the typical example of distributed knowledge
between two agents discussed above: if agent c knows some fact p, i.e., p is distributed
knowledge between a and b, then there exists some fact q such that a knows q and b knows
q → p. So, they are able to derive p by pooling together their knowledge.
Can we generalise this to n agents? Indeed we can, as follows. Define




Θ = ∀y((R1(x, y) ∧ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∧Rn(x, y))→ RD(x, y))
Then, we can prove the following result.700
Proposition 27. For every full frame F , (F ,w) ⊧ ϕ iff (F ,w) ⊧ Θ(x).
The proof is a generalisation of the proof of Lemma 25 for Θ5. It follows that operator
D locally expresses the distributed knowledge of ψ among agents 1, . . . , n:
⋀
i≤n
∀p(Kip→Dp) ∧ ϕ ∧Dψ
Discussion. From Examples 24 and 26 it follows that sopml is strictly more expres-
sive than propositional modal logic, and it can also express local properties that cannot
be dealt with in lpml. Example 24 also indicates when sopml can axiomatise frames
that cannot be characterised in pml: for instance, formula ∃p(◻p ∧ ¬p) characterises705
irreflexive frames, in the same way as ∃p(◻p∧◇◇¬p) characterises intransitive frames.
Venema [52] calls such characterisations negatively definable. The idea here is the fol-
lowing: suppose that formula θ ∈ Lml locally defines some property Θ; is there a formula
that locally defines ¬Θ? As an example, whereas Ra(x,x) is (locally) defined by ◻ap→ p,
the negation ¬R(x,x) is not (locally) defined by ¬(◻p → p), or equivalently, ◻ap ∧ ¬p,710
since this would require that on frames for this formula, atom p were false. Gabbay [23]
came up with a derivation rule, rather than an axiom, to characterise irreflexivity, while
[52] analyses more generally when a negative characterisation of some class of frames also
leads to an axiomatisation of such class. For our discussion, it is important to realise that
reflexivity is actually characterised by a modal scheme ◻aϕ → ϕ, and, in contrast, by715
formula ∀p(◻ap → p) in sopml. But then, irreflexivity is characterised by the negation
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of that sopml formula: ∃p(◻p∧¬p). Moreover, notice that sopml allows us to interpret
such formulas locally, so that we can reason about models that have both reflexive and
irreflexive points.
From Example 24 we also learn that there are first-order properties Θ that cannot720
be characterised by any modal formula θ ∈ Lml , while we do have a formula in sopml
characterising it. It is also possible to come up with formulas in sopml that do not
correspond to any first-order formula (hence, in sopml one could reason locally about
them, but not in lpml). A first example of such formulas is ∃p¬δ for δ = (◇p∧◇◻¬p)→
◇(◻−1◇p∧◻¬p) (here ◻−1 is interpreted as the converse of relation R for ◻). As argued725
in [52], although δ as a scheme characterises Dedekind-complete frames among the linear
orderings, the frames for ¬δ are not elementary, that is, not first-order definable. A
further example is the Löb formula ∀p(◻(◻p → p) → ◻p): this formula characterises
frames with R being transitive and its converse well-founded [52, p. 8].
To conclude our comparison between sopml and lpml, we observe that the ⊡ opera-730
tors act in fact as a sort of linguistic black boxes, bringing the metalanguage of the theory
of first-order logic into the object language of modal logic. In contrast, sopml is more
transparent, as everything is done in the object language. In addition, for the first-order
conditions in [18] there must always be a suitable modal counterpart. Indeed, the axioms
Ax⊡ ∶ ⊡(a⃗) → θ⊡(a⃗, p⃗) in [18] make sense only as long as there is a propositional modal735
formula θ⊡ related to ⊡, and this is not always the case as discussed above. We will see
later that none of this has to be assumed to axiomatise sopml.
Revisiting Example 24, it is no surprise that the sopml formulas in this example all
use existential quantification, because we have the following.
Lemma 28. For a finite set {p1, . . . , pn} of atoms, define ∀p⃗ as ∀p1 . . .∀pn (this is740
well-defined because ∀p∀qφ is equivalent to ∀q∀pφ). Then for all frames F , worlds w,
assignments V , and formulas φ in SOPML we have
1. (F ,w) ⊧ φ iff (F ,w) ⊧ ∀p⃗φ
2. (F ,w) ⊧ ∀f⃗r(φ) φ iff (F , V,w) ⊧ ∀f⃗r(φ) φ
3. (F ,w) ⊧ φ iff (F , V,w) ⊧ φ, where φ is a sentence (i.e., fr(φ) = ∅).745
3.3. Local properties and sopml on non-full frames
So far, we have only looked at how SOPML can represent local properties on full
frames. Here, we consider local properties on frames with a coarser domain of quantifi-
cation. Let us return to formula
∀p(Kap→ p), (11)
which is intended to express that everything a knows is true. Looking at the semantics
of sopml, we can see that (11) holds in (M,w) if and only if
for all U ∈D,Ra(w) ⊆ U implies w ∈ U. (12)
If the domain D is equal to the power set 2W , then (12) is equivalent to w ∈ Ra(w),
so to Ra being locally reflexive. In general, however, there is no guarantee that D is
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equal to 2W . So on non-full frames, (11) does not characterize reflexivity. In fact, on
such frames, there is no sopml formula that characterizes reflexivity.750
Whether this is an important downside of sopml depends on the object of study.
If one is after a logic that can reason about graph-theoretic properties like reflexivity,
then one should consider sopml only on full frames, since on other frames sopml cannot
express these properties. If, on the other hand, the goal is to reason about a particular
subject (such as knowledge) and only use graphs to represent that subject, then sopml755
is useful even on non-full frames. After all, even though (11) does not, in general,
correspond to reflexivity, it does still express the fact that everything known by a is
true—with one caveat.
The quantifier ∀p quantifies only over those valuations of p that are part of the domain
D. So, strictly speaking, (11) means that “for every element U ∈ D, if a knows U then760
U is true.” There are three main ways to interpret this.
1. We could explicitly retain the reference to D, and interpret (11) as “every atomic
(resp. boolean, modal) proposition that a knows is true” if D is any (resp. boolean,
modal) domain of quantification.
2. We could consider D to be the set of properties that are relevant for the problem765
that we are modeling. In this interpretation, the formula ∀p(Kap→ p) might hold
even if there is some proposition T ∈ 2W ∖D such that T is false but known by a.
However, because T /∈ D it is not a relevant property, we don’t care whether a is
wrong about it.
3. We could interpret D as the set of propositions that can be conceptualized. This770
allows us to interpret (11) as “everything that a knows is true”, where it is under-
stood that being able to conceptualize a proposition is a precondition for knowing
that proposition.
As an example of the latter situation, suppose that Alice is looking at a blue object.
However, due to a trick of the light, the object seems green to her. She forms the belief775
that the object is green. This belief is false, so ∀p(Kap → p) does not hold. Now,
suppose that Bob is looking at the same object, but that Bob is from a culture that does
not distinguish between green and blue. Instead, Bob’s culture uses a single concept for
these colours that we will translate as “green/blue”. Bob makes the same observation as
Alice, but based on that observation he forms the belief that the object is green/blue.780
This belief is correct, so, assuming that b’s other beliefs are correct as well, ∀p(Kbp→ p)
holds.2 The difference between Alice and Bob does not lie in their accessibility relations.
Instead, it is caused by the different ways in which they divide the set of possible worlds
into concepts.
The conditions on D then place restrictions on the conceptual space that we assume785
the agents to have. If D is boolean, then the concepts “green” and “blue” need to be
accompanied by concepts “not green” and “green or blue”. If D is modal, then the
2We are somewhat over-simplifying here. Bob is probably capable of conceptualizing several different
subsets of green/blue, such as dark green/blue and light green/blue. Regardless, it is quite possible for
Bob to have no conceptual distinction between the actual and perceived colours of the object while Alice
does have such a distinction.
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sopml formula Model property
∀p(◻ap→ ◻bp) ∀U ∈ D(Ra(w) ⊆ U → Rb(w) ⊆ U)
∀p(◻cp→ ◻a ◻b p) ∀U ∈ D(Rc(w) ⊆ U → (Rb ○Ra)(w) ⊆ U)
∀p(¬ ◻a ) ∃vRa(w, v)
∀p(◻ap→ p) ∀U ∈ D(Ra(w) ⊆ U → w ∈ U)
∀p(¬ ◻a p→ ◻b¬ ◻c p) ∀U ∈ D(Rb(w) /⊆ U → ∀v(Ra(w, v)→ Rc(v) /⊆ U))
∀p(¬ ◻a p→ ¬ ◻b ◻cp) ∀U ∈ D(Ra(w) /⊆ U → (Rc ○Rb)(w) /⊆ U)
∀p((¬ ◻a p ∧ ¬ ◻b q)→ ¬ ◻c (p ∨ q)) ∀U1 ∈ D∀U2 ∈ D((Ra(w) /⊆ U1 ∧Rb(w) /⊆ U2)→ (Rc(w) /⊆ U1 ∪U2))
Table 2: The model properties expressed by several sopml formulas.
concept “green” needs to be accompanied by a concept “knowing to be green”, and if D
is full then every set of worlds corresponds to some concept.
Regardless of the interpretation that we choose, every formula discussed in Table 1790
expresses a property of sopml models. The properties that are expressed by these
formulas can be found in Table 2. Note that the properties in Table 2 are generalisations
of those in Table 1, and that they are equivalent to their counterparts when D is full. The
properties in question require some slightly awkward notation, but conceptually they are
not very hard to grasp: they correspond to the properties in Table 1, except we consider795
only those sets of worlds that are in the domain D. Take, for example, ∀p(◻ap → p).
On full frames, this corresponds to w ∈ Ra(w), which is equivalent to every superset of
Ra(w) containing w, so to ∀U ∈ 2
W (Ra(w) ⊆ U → w ∈ U). The corresponding property
for non-full frames is obtained by replacing 2W by the domain D.
4. (In)completeness800
One well-established way to understand a logic is to introduce an axiomatisation for
it. After all, since there is an infinite number of valid formulas, we cannot explicitly
enumerate all of them. But if we have a complete axiomatisation, then we can at least
implicitly know the valid formulas and understand why they are valid.
It turns out that not all variants of SOPML are axiomatisable. Still, even if a logic805
is unaxiomatisable it is worthwhile to prove that it is so, for two reasons. Firstly, of
course, if we have a proof that no axiomatisation exists, then we can stop trying to find
an axiomatisation. Secondly, even though an unaxiomatisability result arguably provides
less insight regarding the theorems of the logic than an axiomatisation, it does still tell
us something about the logic, particularly about its computational complexity.810
In this paper we discuss many different variants of sopml, which differ on the domain
of quantification (full, modal, boolean, any), restrictions on the accessibility relations
(reflexive, transitive, symmetric), availability of common knowledge, and the number of
indices. For some of these variants, axiomatisability and unaxiomatisability results are
known from [21, 36, 37]. In particular, [21] provides axiomatisations for all single agent815
normal logics interpreted on boolean and generic frames, as well as an axiomatisation for
epistemic full frames. Here we extend several of these results to the multi-modal case for
the first time. Tables 3 and 4 give an overview of these results. In summary, the results
are that sopml without common knowledge is unaxiomatisable on full frames (with the
exception of the special case of single-agent S5), but axiomatisable on modal, boolean820
and the class of all frames, while sopml with common knowledge is unaxiomatisable
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S5 (∣I ∣ = 1) S5 (∣I ∣ ≥ 2) K
full axiomatisable [21] unaxiomatisable (Thm. 50) unaxiomatisable [21]
modal axiomatisable (Thm. 43)
boolean axiomatisable [21] axiomatisable (Thm. 43)
all axiomatisable (Thm. 43)
Table 3: Axiomatisation results for languages L without common knowledge.
S5 (∣I ∣ = 1) S5 (∣I ∣ ≥ 2) K
full axiomatisable [21] unaxiomatisable (Thm. 50) unaxiomatisable [21]
modal axiomatisable (Thm. 43) unaxiomatisable (Thm. 62) unaxiomatisable (Thm. 57)
boolean axiomatisable [21]
unaxiomatisable (Cor. 63) unaxiomatisable (Cor. 60)
all axiomatisable (Thm. 43)
Table 4: Axiomatisation results for languages L∗ with common knowledge.
regardless of the domain of quantification3. Note that, if ∣I ∣ = 1 then ◻∗ reduces to ◻
on S5 frames, so the entries in the first column of Table 4 follow immediately from the
results in the first column of Table 3.
So in most cases, adding common knowledge makes the validity problem harder. This825
is in contrast to the model checking problem, where adding common knowledge is “free”,
in the sense that model checking for sopml is PSPACE-complete, whether or not we
have a common knowledge operator (see Theorem 17).
We restrict ourselves to the classes of models for logics S5 and K in these tables. This
is because these two classes are the most relevant for our analysis. Our axiomatisability830
results are slightly more general, see Theorem 43 for the exact statement. Our unax-
iomatisability results are stated for logics S5 and K, but with a few minor modifications
these proofs could easily be adapted to other normal modalities, including KD45 and
S4.2. Such results give us useful insights into the computational properties of sopml,
as well as its amenability for knowledge representation and reasoning.835
Remark 29. In most of this paper, we use different notation for sopml (◻a,◊a,◻
∗) and
sopel (Ka,Ma,C). In this section we discuss both sopml and sopel, so for the sake of
readability we only use the sopml notation.
Also, we write sopml to denote generically logics without operator ◻∗, while sopml∗
refers to logics with ◻∗. The distinction will be clear from the context.840
4.1. Complete Axiomatisations
This section is devoted to axiomatise several classes of validities on Kripke frames
built on sets I of agent indices and AP of atomic propositions. We first present a class of
logics Kx, one for each x ∈ {ap,pl ,ml}. In this section all logics are defined on languages
without common knowledge.845
3Again, with the exception of the single agent S5 case.
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Definition 30 (Logics Kx). For each x ∈ {ap,pl ,ml}, the axioms and inference rules
of Kx are as follows:
Prop all instances of propositional tautologies
K ◻a(φ→ ψ)→ (◻aφ→ ◻aψ)
Exx ∀pφ→ φ[p/ψ], where ψ ∈ Lx
BF ∀p ◻a φ→ ◻a∀pφ
MP from φ→ ψ and φ infer ψ
Nec from φ infer ◻aφ
Gen from φ→ ψ infer φ→ ∀pψ, for p not free in φ
The axioms Prop and K are standard of any modal logic, as are the rules Modus850
Ponens (MP) and Necessitation (Nec). Note how axiom Exx is parameterised by
x ∈ {ap,pl ,ml}. The axiom specifies the language Lx which acts as the domain of
quantification, or, more precisely, what kind of formulas can be substituted as an in-
stance for the universal quantifier. Axiom BF is known as the Barcan formula and it
says the following. In our models M = ⟨W,D,R,V ⟩ the domain of quantification D is855
defined globally, and does not depend on the world w of evaluation. To give an example
where the dependence of D on world w would cease BF to hold, consider a structure
N = ⟨W,{Dw}w∈W ,R, V ⟩, with W = {x, y, z} and R = {(x, y), (y, z)}. Also, suppose
Dx = {{x},{y, z}} and Dy = 2
W ≠ Dx. Then, by restricting the clause for quantification
in Definition 8 to each Dw, we have (N , x) ⊧ ∀p◻(p→ ◻p) but not (N , x) ⊧ ◻∀p(p→ ◻p).860
In Example 31 we prove that the converse of BF is derivable in all Kx.
The scheme of axioms Exx and the Generalisation rule Gen are typical principles
of quantification. Axiom Exx is the elimination axiom for ∀: if something holds for all
allowed valuations, then it also holds for each instance from the domain (which can be
the set of all atoms, boolean formulas, or modal formulas.) The rule of Generalisation865
is the introduction rule for ∀: if ψ follows from φ for an arbitrary p, we infer that ∀pψ
follows from φ.
As customary in pml, by considering a suitable combination of axioms
T ◻aφ→ φ
B φ→ ◻a ◇a φ
4 ◻aφ→ ◻a ◻a φ
870
we can introduce the following normal extensions of Kx, also for x ∈ {ap,pl ,ml}:
Tx ∶= Kx +T
S4x ∶= Kx +T + 4
Bx ∶= Kx +T +B
S5x ∶= Kx +T +B + 4
875
This gives us 15 logics, 5 for each type x ∈X.
The notions of proof and theoremhood are defined as usual. A formula φ is derivable
in logic L from a set ∆ of formulas, or ∆ ⊢L φ, iff for some φ0, . . . , φm ∈ ∆, formula
⋀i≤m φi → φ is a theorem in L, or ⊢L ⋀i≤m φi → φ.
Example 31. As an example, we provide proofs in logic Kap of the following theorems880
and derived inference rules, which will be routinely used in the rest of the section, often
without explicit mention:
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• converse of the Barcan formula CBF ◻∀pφ→ ∀p ◻ φ:
1. ∀pφ→ φ by axiom Exap
2. ◻a(∀pφ→ φ)→ (◻a∀pφ→ ◻aφ) by axiom K
3. ◻a(∀pφ→ φ) from (1) by rule Nec
4. ◻a∀pφ→ ◻aφ from (2), (3) by rule MP
5. ◻a∀pφ→ ∀p ◻a φ from (4) by rule Gen, as p is not free in ◻a∀pφ
• vacuous quantification φ→ ∀pφ, whenever p does not appear in φ:
1. φ→ φ propositional tautology
2. φ→ ∀pφ by axiom Gen
By axiom Exap we then obtain φ↔ ∀pφ, whenever p does not appear in φ.885
• distribution of quantification ∀p(φ→ ψ)→ (∀pφ→ ∀pψ):
1. ∀p(φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ) by axiom Exap
2. ∀pφ→ φ by axiom Exap
3. φ→ (∀p(φ→ ψ)→ ψ) from (1) by tautology (A→ (B → C))↔ (B → (A→ C))
4. ∀pφ→ (∀p(φ→ ψ)→ ψ)) from (2), (3) by transitivity of implication
5. ∀p(φ→ ψ)→ (∀pφ→ ψ) from (4) by tautology (A→ (B → C))↔ (B → (A→ C))
6. (∀p(φ→ ψ) ∧ ∀pφ)→ ψ from (5) by tautology (A→ (B → C))↔ ((A ∧B)→ C)
7. (∀p(φ→ ψ) ∧ ∀pφ)→ ∀pψ from (6) by Gen
8. ∀p(φ→ ψ)→ (∀pφ→ ∀pψ) from (7) by tautology (A→ (B → C))↔ ((A ∧B)→ C)
Since CBF, vacuous quantification and distribution of quantification are provable in
Kap, they are theorems in all the other 14 logics above. We also recall that inferring
◻aφ → ◻aψ from φ → ψ is a derivable rule in modal logic, and whenever p does not
appear free in φ, formula ∀p(φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ∀pψ) is a theorem in all our logics.890
We now prove the soundness and completeness results for logics Lx w.r.t. the cor-
responding class K of Kripke frames, starting with soundness. In the rest of the paper
L ranges over {K,T,S4,B,S5}. Given a logic Lx, let τ(Lx) be a subset of {r, t, s},
such that Lx includes axiom T iff τ contains r (for reflexivity), Lx includes axiom 4 iff τ
contains t (for transitivity), and Lx includes axiom B iff τ contains s (for symmetry).895
Theorem 32 (Soundness). For x ∈ {ap,pl ,ml}, for every logic Lx and formula φ ∈
Lsopml ,
⊢Lx φ implies K
τ(Lx)
x̂ ⊧ φ
Proof. As customary, the axioms of each logic Lx are shown to be valid in the
corresponding class K
τ(Lx)
x̂ of frames, and the inference rules are shown to preserve
validity in K
τ(Lx)
x̂ . Specifically, axioms Prop, K, MP, and Nec are valid in any frame.
The validity of axioms T, 4, and B in specific classes of frames follows as in standard
propositional modal logics [7]. The validity of axioms Exx in each corresponding class900
of frames follows by Lemma 11.(2), while the validity of Gen follows by Lemma 11.(1).
We provide a proof for Exap : suppose that (M,w) ⊧ ∀pφ, that is, for every U ∈ D,
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(MpU ,w) ⊧ φ. By Lemma 11.(2a), ⟦ψ⟧ ∈ D, hence in particular (M
p
⟦ψ⟧,w) ⊧ φ. Then,
by Lemma 11.(2b), (M,w) ⊧ φ[p/ψ]. As regards Gen, suppose that (M,w) ⊧ φ and
p ∉ fr(φ). In particular, for every U ∈D, V (fr(φ)) = V pU (fr(φ)), and by Lemma 11.(1), we905
have (MpU ,w) ⊧ φ as well. By MP we obtain that (M
p
U ,w) ⊧ ψ, and since U is arbitrary,
(M,w) ⊧ ∀pψ. Moreover, the Barcan formula BF is valid as in any frame all worlds
have the same domain of quantification, namely D ⊆ 2W . Indeed, (M,w) ⊧ ∀p ◻a φ iff
for all U ∈ D, (MpU ,w) ⊧ ◻aφ, iff for every w
′ ∈ Ra(w), (M
p
U ,w
′) ⊧ φ. But this means
that for every w′ ∈ Ra(w), (M,w′) ⊧ ∀pφ, that is, (M,w) ⊧ ◻a∀pφ.910
As a consequence of Theorem 32, all our 15 logics are sound w.r.t. the corresponding
classes of frames. Moreover, as a by-product of soundness, we obtain that the inclu-
sions (4) between theories put forward in Section 2.2 are all strict:
Th(Kall) ⊂ Th(Kbool) ⊂ Th(Kmodal) ⊂ Th(Kfull) (13)
To prove this, observe that each axiom Exx holds in Kx , but in no more general class
of frames. Finally, let Exsopml be the scheme ∀pφ → φ[p/ψ], for ψ ∈ Lsopml . It is easy
to check that Exsopml ∈ Th(Kfull), but Exsopml ∉ Th(Kmodal).
Next we state the completeness result. Here we use the notation of Theorem 32.
Theorem 33 (Completeness). For x ∈ {ap,pl ,ml}, and every formula φ ∈ Lsopml ,915
K
τ(Lx)
x̂ ⊧ φ implies ⊢Lx φ
Theorem 33 guarantees completeness of a logic of sort x, with respect to models of
type x̂, for the sorts of atomic propositions and propositional and modal formulas. Com-
pleteness also holds if we add properties such as reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry
to the frames, as long as we add the corresponding axioms from {T,4,B} to the logic.
To our knowledge this is the first completeness result for sopml in a multi-agent setting.920
To prove Theorem 33 for x ∈ {ap,pl ,ml}, we show that if a formula φ is Lx-consistent,
then we can construct an appropriate modelMLx that satisfies φ. For logic Lap (respec-
tively, Lpl , Lml) this amounts to finding models whose underlying frame is any frame
(respectively, a boolean algebra or a boolean algebra with operators). We begin with the
cases for Lap for clarity’s sake.925
4.1.1. Completeness of Lap
In this section we show that if a formula φ is Lap-consistent, that is, ⊬Lap ¬φ, then we
can construct a (canonical) modelMLap = ⟨F , V ⟩ that satisfies φ. Moreover, F is shown
to belong to the class Kall of all frames. This implies that Kall /⊧ ¬φ.
Definition 34. Let Λ ⊆ Lsopml be sets of formulas over set AP of atoms, and Y a930
denumerable set of atoms. We say that Λ is
Lap-consistent iff Λ /⊢Lap 
complete iff for every formula φ ∈ Lsopml , φ ∈ Λ or ¬φ ∈ Λ
maximal iff Λ is consistent and complete
Y -rich iff for every φ ∈ Lsopml , if ∃pφ ∈ Λ then φ[p/q] ∈ Λ for some q ∈ Y
saturated iff Λ is maximal and Y -rich for some Y ⊆ AP
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We omit the subscript Lap whenever clear by the context.
We remark that, by the definition of derivability, a set Λ is inconsistent iff for some
φ0, . . . , φm ∈ Λ, ⊢ ⋀i≤m φi → , that is, ⊢ ⋀i≤m φi → ¬ψ for every ψ ∈ Λ.
We now prove that every consistent set can be saturated.935
Lemma 35 (Saturation). Let ∆ be a maximal set of formulas over AP . Then there
exists a saturated set of formulas Φ over AP ∪Y , such that ∆ ⊂ Φ, where Y is an infinite
set of new atoms (i.e., disjoint from AP ).
Proof. Let θ0, θ1, . . . be an enumeration of the formulas over AP ∪ Y , and q0, q1, . . .
an enumeration of atoms in Y . We define by induction a sequence Φ0,Φ1, . . . of sets of940






Φn ∪ {θn} if Φn ∪ {θn} is consistent and θn is not of the form ∃pχ;
Φn ∪ {θn, χ[p/q]} if Φn ∪ {θn} is consistent, θn is of the form ∃pχ,
and q ∈ Y is the first atom not appearing in Φn ∪ {θn};
Φn ∪ {¬θn} otherwise.
Notice that, since Y is an infinite set of new atoms and finitely many θ appear
in Φn ∖ Φ0, for each n ∈ N, we can always find an atom q ∈ Y that does not appear in
Φn∪{θn}. Now we prove by induction on n that every Φn is consistent. First of all, Φ0 = ∆
is consistent by hypothesis. As to the inductive step, suppose that Φn is consistent, we945
consider the various cases. If Φn+1 = Φn ∪ {θn} and θn is not of the form ∃pχ, then
Φn∪{θn} = Φn+1 has to be consistent, by construction. Further, Φn+1 = Φn∪{θn, χ[p/q]}
if Φn ∪ {θn} is consistent, θn is of the form ∃pχ, and q is the first atom that does not
appear in Φn ∪ {θn}. To obtain a contradiction, suppose that Φn+1 is inconsistent. In
particular, for some ϕ0, . . . , ϕm ∈ Φn,950
⊢ (⋀
i≤m
ϕi ∧ θn)→ ¬χ[p/q]
Since q is assumed not to appear in Φn nor in θn, by an application of Gen we obtain
⊢ (⋀
i≤m
ϕi ∧ θn)→ ∀p¬χ
i.e., ⊢ (⋀i≤m ϕi ∧ θn) → ¬θn, and, since ⊢ (⋀i≤m ϕi ∧ θn) → θn trivially, we obtain that
⊢ (⋀i≤m ϕi ∧ θn) → , that is, Φn ∪ {θn} is not consistent, against hypothesis. Hence,
Φn+1 = Φn ∪ {θn, χ[p/q]} is indeed consistent.
Finally, Φn+1 = Φn ∪ {¬θn} only if Φn ∪ {θn} is not consistent. Indeed, if Φn is955
consistent, Φn ∪ {θn} and Φn ∪ {¬θn} cannot be both inconsistent, since otherwise for
some ϕ0, . . . , ϕm, ϕ
′















ϕ′i → (¬θn ∧ θn)
and therefore Φn itself is inconsistent, a contradiction. Hence, Φn ∪ {¬θn} = Φn+1 is
indeed consistent.960
Now let Φ = ⋃n∈N Φn: Φ is consistent as each Φn is. If that were not the case, there
would be ϕ0, . . . , ϕm ∈ Φ such that ⊢ ⋀i≤m ϕi → . Then suppose that k is the smallest
index such that all φi appear in Φk. It follows that Φk is inconsistent as well, against
hypothesis. Moreover, Φ extends ∆ and it is maximal and Y -rich by construction.
We now describe informally the construction of the canonical model for a formula φ965
such that ⊬ ¬φ. First, define W as the set of all saturated sets w of formulas over AP ∪Y
as obtained in Lemma 35. Notice that W is non-empty as the set {φ} is consistent by
hypothesis, and by Lemma 35 there exists a saturated set Φ ⊇ {φ} in W . Further, for
w,w′ ∈ W and a ∈ I, define Ra(w,w′) iff {ψ ∣ ◻aψ ∈ w} ⊆ w′. Finally, for every atom
p ∈ AP ∪ Y , we consider set Up = {w ∈ W ∣ p ∈ w} ⊆ W and define the domain D of970
propositions as {Up ∣ p ∈ AP ∪ Y }.
Definition 36 (Canonical Model). The canonical model L is a tuple ML = ⟨W, D,
R, V ⟩ where (i) W , D and R are defined as above; and (ii) V is the assignment such
that V (p) = Up.
Note that every consistent formula φ must be contained in some Φ ∈W . Next we prove975
that the canonical model w.r.t. any Lap is indeed a model based on a frame in K
τ(Lap)
all
(recall that âp = all and that Lap represents 5 different logics: Kap ,Tap ,S4ap ,Bap , and
S5ap).




Proof. By the remarks above, W is a non-empty set of saturated sets, D is a subset
of 2W , and V is a function from AP ∪ Y to D. Moreover, axiom T (respectively, 4, B)
enforces relation Ra on W to be reflexive (respectively, transitive, symmetric), as it is
the case for propositional modal logic. As an illustrative example, we consider the case
for T: by maximality, for every w ∈ W , ◻aψ → ψ ∈ w for every formula ψ ∈ Lsopml , and985
by closure under MP we have {ψ ∈ Lsopml ∣ ◻ψ ∈ w} ⊆ w, that is, Ra(w,w) by definition.
We can finally prove the truth lemma for logics Lap . Here we adapt the proof in [20]
for propositional epistemic languages without common knowledge.
Lemma 38 (Truth lemma). For every logic Lap, in the canonical model MLap , for990
every w ∈W and every formula ψ over AP ∪ Y ,
(MLap ,w) ⊧ ψ iff ψ ∈ w
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of ψ. As to the base of induction
for ψ = p, by definition of satisfaction, (MLap ,w) ⊧ p iff w ∈ V (p) iff p ∈ w.
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For ψ = ¬χ, (MLap ,w) ⊧ ψ iff (MLap ,w) /⊧ χ, iff by induction hypothesis χ ∉ w. Since
w is maximal, this is the case iff ψ ∈ w.995
For ψ = χ → χ′, (MLap ,w) ⊧ ψ iff (MLap ,w) /⊧ χ or (MLap ,w) ⊧ χ
′. By induction
hypothesis this is the case iff χ ∉ w or χ′ ∈ w; in both cases we have that ψ ∈ w, as w is
maximal.
Suppose that ψ = ∀pχ. ⇐ Let ψ ∈ w. By axiom Exap we have that χ[p/q] ∈ w
for every q ∈ AP ∪ Y . By induction hypothesis (MLap ,w) ⊧ χ[p/q] for every q. Now,1000




,w) ⊧ χ, and since variant V pUq was chosen arbitrarily, we
obtain that (MLap ,w) ⊧ ψ. ⇒ Assume that ψ ∉ w. Since w is maximal, ∃p¬χ ∈ w,
and w is Y -rich, so ¬χ[p/q] ∈ w for some atom q ∈ Y . Then, by induction hypothesis,
(MLap ,w) /⊧ χ[p/q], and by Lemma 11.(2b), ((MLap)
p
V (q),w) /⊧ χ. In particular, for1005
Uq = V (q) ∈D, ((MLap)
p
Uq
,w) /⊧ χ, i.e., (MLap ,w) /⊧ ψ.
Suppose that ψ = ◻aχ. ⇐ Assume that ψ ∈ w and v ∈ Ra(w). By definition of
Ra, χ ∈ v; therefore by induction hypothesis (MLap , v) ⊧ χ. Thus, (MLap ,w) ⊧ ψ.
⇒ Assume that ψ ∉ w and consider set {φ ∣ ◻aφ ∈ w} ∪ {¬χ}. This set is consistent,
for if not, then for some φ1, . . . , φn ∈ {φ ∣ ◻aφ ∈ w}, ⊢ ⋀φ → χ. Then, by axiom1010
K, ⊢ ⋀◻aφ → ◻aχ and since ⋀◻aφ ∈ w, also ◻aχ ∈ w against hypothesis. Now we
want to saturate ∆ = {φ ∣ ◻aφ ∈ w} ∪ {¬χ} to obtain v ∈ W such that Ra(w, v) and
¬χ ∈ v. However, we cannot directly apply Lemma 35 to ∆, as it is a set of formulas over
AP ∪ Y . We prove that ∆ can nonetheless be extended to a saturated set Φ of formulas
over AP ∪ Y . The proof structure is similar to the one for Lemma 35, namely, we define1015






Φn ∪ {θn} if Φn ∪ {θn} is consistent and θn is not of the form ∃pζ;
Φn ∪ {θn, ζ[p/q]} if Φn ∪ {θn} is consistent, θn is of the form ∃pζ,
and q ∈ AP ∪ Y is the first atom such that
Φn ∪ {θn, ζ[p/q]} is consistent;
Φn ∪ {¬θn} otherwise.
We prove by induction on n that every Φn is consistent (and well-defined). First of
all, Φ0 = ∆ is consistent as shown above. As to the inductive step, suppose that Φn
is consistent. We only consider the case where Φn ∪ {θn} is consistent and θn is of the
form ∃pζ, and show that Φn+1 is well-defined, that is, there exists q ∈ AP ∪ Y such that1020
Φn ∪ {θn, ζ[p/q]} is consistent as well. To obtain a contradiction, suppose that for every





ψi ∧ θn → ¬ζ[p/q])
where ψ0, . . . , ψn are all the formulas in Φn ∖∆.





ψi ∧ θn → ¬ζ[p/q])
and since all ◻aϕi belong to w, by maximality we derive that ◻a(⋀i≤k ψi∧θn → ¬ζ[p/q]) ∈1025
w for all q ∈ AP ∪ Y (*). Take an atom q not occurring in ⋀i≤k ψi ∧ θn and consider the
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formula ∀q ◻a (⋀i≤k ψi ∧ θn → ¬ζ[p/q]). We claim that this formula is a member of w,
because, if not, by maximality, ∃q◇a (⋀i≤k ψi ∧ θn ∧ ζ[p/q]) ∈ w, and, by saturation, for
some q′ ∈ AP ∪ Y , we have ◇a(⋀i≤k ψi ∧ θn ∧ ζ[p/q′]) ∈ w, contradicting (*).
Since ∀q◻a (⋀i≤k ψi ∧ θn → ¬ζ[p/q]) ∈ w by axiom BF we obtain that ◻a∀q(⋀i≤k ψi ∧1030
θn → ¬ζ[p/q]) ∈ w as well, and since q is assumed not to appear in ⋀i≤k ψi ∧ θn we derive
◻a(⋀i≤k ψi ∧ θn → ∀q¬ζ[p/q]) ∈ w, and therefore ⋀i≤k ψi ∧ θn → ∀q¬ζ[p/q] ∈ ∆. Further,
since ψ0, . . . , ψn belong to Φn, we obtain that Φn∪{θn} ⊢ ∀q¬ζ[p/q]. But this contradicts
the fact that Φn ∪ {θn} is consistent (recall that θn = ∃pζ). As a result, Φn ∪ {θn, ζ[p/q]}
is indeed consistent for some q ∈ AP ∪ Y .1035
The other inductive cases of the construction go as in Lemma 35. Finally, Φ = ⋃n∈N Φn
is consistent as each Φn is so. In particular, Φ is a saturated set in W such that Φ ∈ Ra(w)
by construction. By induction hypothesis (MLap ,Φ) /⊧ χ, that is, (MLap ,w) /⊧ ψ.
By Lemma 38, if ⊬Lap ¬φ then there exists a saturated set w ⊇ {φ} such that in the
canonical model MLap , we have (MLap ,w) ⊧ φ. Moreover, MLap is based on a frame1040
F ∈ Kall . Thus, Kall /⊧ ¬φ. This concludes the completeness proof for Lap .
4.1.2. Completeness of Lpl and Lml
In this section we discuss how to adapt the completeness proof for Lap in the previous
section to logics Lpl and Lml . As regards Lpl , we need to modify the definition of the
canonical model and the proof of the truth lemma, starting with the former.1045
Definition 39 (Canonical Model). The canonical model for Lpl is a tuple MLpl =
⟨W,D,R,V ⟩ where
• W , R and V are given as in Definition 36;
• D is the domain of sets Uψ = {w ∈W ∣ ψ ∈ w} ⊆W , for every propositional formula
ψ ∈ Lpl over AP ∪ Y .1050
Given Definition 39 of canonical model, we can show that it is indeed based on a
boolean frame.
Lemma 40. The canonical model MLpl is boolean.
Proof. We have to prove that domain D is closed under boolean operations. Let Uφ
and Uφ′ be sets in D, we show that Uφ∩Uφ′ = Uφ∧φ′ ∈D. Clearly, w ∈ Uφ∩Uφ′ iff φ ∈ w and1055
φ′ ∈ w, and by maximality, this is the case iff φ∧φ′ ∈ w as well. Closure under disjunction
is proved similarly. As to taking complement, we show that W ∖ Uφ = U¬φ ∈ D. Again,
w ∉ Uφ iff φ ∉ w, and by maximality, this is the case iff ¬φ ∈ w.
As a consequence of Lemma 40,MLpl is based on a frame in Kbool . Moreover, we are
able to prove the following version of the truth lemma.1060
Lemma 41 (Truth lemma). For every logic Lpl , in the canonical model MLpl , for
every w ∈W and every formula ψ over AP ∪ Y ,
(MLpl ,w) ⊧ ψ iff ψ ∈ w
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Proof. To prove the truth lemma for Lpl we have to modify the proof of Lemma 38.
Specifically, we can first prove that for every ψ ∈ Lpl , (MLpl ,w) ⊧ ψ iff ψ ∈ w, as in
Lemma 38. In particular, we obtain that Uϕ = ⟦ϕ⟧MLpl = {w ∈W ∣ (MLpl ,w) ⊧ ϕ} ∈ D.1065
Then, the proof for any ψ ∈ Lsopml is given by induction on the length of ψ, similarly as
in Lemma 38, the only case of interest being quantified formulas. For ψ = ∀pχ, if ψ ∈ w
then by axiom Expl we have that χ[p/ϕ] ∈ w, for any φ ∈ Lpl . By induction hypothesis,
(MLpl ,w) ⊧ χ[p/ϕ]. Now consider the set Uϕ = ⟦ϕ⟧MLpl ∈ D. By Lemma 11.(2b), it is
the case that ((MLpl )
p
Uϕ
,w) ⊧ χ, and since the choice of ϕ (and therefore of variant V pUϕ)1070
is arbitrary, we obtain that (MLpl ,w) ⊧ ∀pχ. As to the implication from left to right,
the proof is the same as in Lemma 38, as each w is maximal and rich.
As a consequence of Lemma 41, the truth lemma also holds for boolean frames and
we obtain a completeness proof for Lpl .
We now discuss how to modify the procedure above to obtain completeness results1075
for the logics Lml . Firstly, the canonical model for Lml is now defined as a tupleMLml =
⟨W,D,R,V ⟩ where (i) W , R and V are given as in Definition 36; and (ii) D is the
domain of sets Uψ = {w ∈W ∣ ψ ∈ w} ⊆W , for every modal formula ψ ∈ Lml over AP ∪Y .
In particular, it is easy to check that the domain D in MLml is a boolean algebra with
operators. Secondly, by adapting the proof of Lemma 41, we can prove the truth lemma1080
for MLml :
Lemma 42 (Truth lemma). For every logic Lml , in the canonical model MLml , for
every w ∈W and every formula ψ over AP ∪ Y ,
(MLml ,w) ⊧ ψ iff ψ ∈ w
This completes the completeness proof for the logics Lml .
We conclude the section by summarising the soundness and completeness results for1085
our logics w.r.t. the relevant classes of frames.
Theorem 43 (Soundness and Completeness). For x ∈ {ap,pl ,ml}, each logic Lx
is sound and complete w.r.t. the class K
τ(Lx)
x̂ of frames that are reflexive (respectively,
transitive, symmetric), whenever Lx includes axiom T (respectively, 4, B).
As a result, for types ap, pl , and ml we are able to prove soundness and completeness1090
for all normal modalities (i.e., K,T,S4,B, and S5) in a multi-modal setting.
4.1.3. Generalised Completeness
We now extend the completeness results in the previous section by considering extra
axioms expressing properties of frames. Specifically, let L be any axiomatisation men-
tioned in Theorem 43. Then, if we extend L with the universal closure ∀p⃗ψ of a formula1095
ψ ∈ Lsopml , the resulting calculus L + ∀p⃗ψ is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of
frames satisfying the mso condition ∀x∀P⃗STx(ψ), where P⃗ are all the unary predicates
appearing in STx(ψ).
Theorem 44. Let ψ be a formula in sopml, then the logic L+∀p⃗ψ is sound and complete
w.r.t. the corresponding class K of frames satisfying ∀x∀P⃗STx(ψ).1100
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Proof. Soundness follows immediately by Lemma 20, as every frame that satisfies
condition ∀x∀P⃗STx(ψ) = ∀xSTx(∀p⃗ψ), also validates ∀p⃗ψ. As to completeness, if ∀p⃗ψ
is an axiom, then it appears in every state of the canonical model M, and by the truth
lemma, M validates ∀p⃗ψ. Finally, by another application of Lemma 20, F validates
∀x∀P⃗STx(ψ).1105
By the result above we immediately obtain that for every formula θ(a⃗, p⃗) appear-
ing in Table 1, L + ∀pθ(a⃗, p⃗) is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of frames satisfying
∀x∀P⃗Θ(a⃗, x). For instance, K + ∃p(◻ap ∧ ¬p) is a sound and complete axiomatisa-
tion of the class of irreflexive frames (notice that, since ∃p(◻ap ∧ ¬p) is a sentence, its
universal closure is equal to the formula itself.) More generally, there is a one-to-one1110
correspondence between a sopml axiom ∀p⃗θ and the mso condition ∀x∀P⃗STx(θ) on the
corresponding class of sound and complete frames.
4.2. Incompleteness
In Section 4.1 we provided complete axiomatisations for languages without common
knowledge, in the classes of all, boolean, and modal frames. In this section we prove our1115
main unaxiomatisability results for sopml. Specifically, in Section 4.2.1 we show that
the set of validities in sopel (without common knowledge) interpreted on full frames
is unaxiomatisable whenever we assume at least two agents in our frames. Further, in
Section 4.2.2 we prove that, with common knowledge, sopml is unaxiomatisable on modal
frames already when considering a single agent. We then demonstrate (Corollaries 58,1120
61 and 63 as well as Theorem 62) how this proof can be extended to the other classes of
frames. These results complete Tables 3 and 4.
4.2.1. 2-agent sopel on Full Frames is Unaxiomatisable
Recall that, as discussed at the beginning of Section 4, an axiomatisation for single-
agent sopel on full frames was introduced in [21]. Here we show that, this result cannot1125
be generalised to the multi-agent case, i.e., we demonstrate that multi-agent sopel is
not recursively axiomatisable on full frames.
We prove this unaxiomatisability result by reducing the validity problem of diadic
second order logic (dso) to the validity problem of sopel. Since the former is known
not to be recursively enumerable, this implies that the latter is also not recursively1130
enumerable, and therefore in particular not axiomatisable. The reduction that we use is
somewhat similar to the one used in [36] to prove the unaxiomatisability of single-agent
sopml on full frames with S4.2 or weaker modalities. Specifically, both the proof from
[36] and the proof presented here represent a second order domain D in a Kripke model
by taking D ⊆ W and (D ×D) ⊆ W . Quantification over diadic relations on Dom then1135
corresponds to propositional (i.e., monadic) quantification over (D ×D). The difference
between the two proofs lies in how they characterize the models where D ⊆ W and
D×D ⊆W , and in how second order formulas are translated once such a characterisation
has been established.
Since the reduction is from the validity problem of diadic second order logic, let us1140
first briefly define this logic.
Let a set X of first-order variables and a set R of second order variables be given.
Then the language of diadic second order logic is given by the following normal form:
θ ∶∶= R(x, y) ∣ x = y ∣ ¬θ ∣ θ → θ ∣ ∀xθ ∣ ∀Rθ
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where x,x ∈ X and R ∈R.
The formulas of dso can be evaluated on models (Dom, ρ) that consist of a domain
Dom and an assignment function ρ that assigns to each first-order variable x an element
ρ(x) ∈ Dom and to each second-order variable R a relation ρ(R) ⊆ Dom × Dom. Given1145
a model (Dom, ρ) an element d ∈ Dom and a relation E ⊆ Dom ×Dom, the assignments
ρ[x↦ d] and ρ[R ↦ E] are the modifications of ρ that map x ∈ X to d ∈ Dom and R ∈R
to E ⊆ Dom ×Dom, respectively.
Given these preliminaries, we can define the semantics of dso in the usual way.
Definition 45. We define whether a model (Dom, ρ) satisfies a formula θ of dso recur-1150
sively as follows:
(Dom, ρ) ⊧ R(x, y) iff (ρ(x), ρ(y)) ∈ ρ(R)
(Dom, ρ) ⊧ x = y iff ρ(x) = ρ(y)
(Dom, ρ) ⊧ ¬θ iff (Dom, ρ) /⊧ θ
(Dom, ρ) ⊧ θ → θ′ iff (Dom, ρ) /⊧ θ or (Dom, ρ) ⊧ θ′
(Dom, ρ) ⊧ ∀xθ iff for every d ∈ Dom, (Dom, ρ[x↦ d]) ⊧ θ
(Dom, ρ) ⊧ ∀Rθ iff for every E ⊆ Dom ×Dom, (D,ρ[R ↦ E]) ⊧ θ
A formula θ of dso is valid, denoted ⊧ θ, if (Dom, ρ) ⊧ θ for every model (Dom, ρ).
In general, a formula of dso can contain free first- and second-order variables. Our
goal is to make a reduction from the validity problem of dso, however, so we only care
about whether a formula is valid. If θ is a dso formula with a free first-order variable1155
x (a free second-order variable R, respectively), then θ is valid if and only if ∀xθ (∀Rθ,
respectively) is valid. As a result, it suffices for us to consider only the sentences of dso,
i.e., the formulas without free variables. Furthermore, if θ is a sentence then whether
(Dom, ρ) ⊧ θ depends only on Dom. As such, we can consider our models to be given by
the domain Dom only, where we say that Dom ⊧ θ if and only if (Dom, ρ) ⊧ θ for every1160
assignment ρ.
Now, let us introduce the reduction from the validity problem of dso to sopel’s.
This reduction has two parts: firstly, we define a formula ψmodel of sopel and use it to
characterize a specific class of pointed models. Then, we define a translation f from the
formulas of dso to the formulas of sopel, with the property that1165
for every formula θ in dso, there is a model Dom such that Dom ⊧ θ iff there
is a pointed model (M,w) of sopml such that (M,w) ⊧ ψmodel ∧ f(θ).
Before defining ψmodel and f(φ), however, let us present an auxiliary formula ψunique(a,χ)
that will be useful in several places. This formula is very similar to a uniqueness formula
introduced in [12].1170
Definition 46. Let a ∈ I be an index and χ ∈ Lsopml a formula. Then
ψunique(a,χ) ∶= ◊aχ ∧ ∀q(◊a(q ∧ χ)→ ◻a(χ→ q)).
Lemma 47. Let a be an index in I, χ ∈ Lsopml any formula,M any full epistemic model,
and w any world in M. Then (M,w) ⊧ ψunique(a,χ) if and only if there is exactly one
a-successor w′ of w such that (M,w′) ⊧ χ.
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Proof. Suppose (M,w) ⊧ ψunique(a,χ). Then, in particular, (M,w) ⊧ ◊aχ, so there
is at least one a-successor w′ of w such that (M,w′) ⊧ χ. Suppose now, towards a1175
contradiction, that there are two different a-successors w′ and w′′ of w such that χ holds
on both w′ and w′′. Then, since M is a full model, there is some assignment for q such
that q holds in w′ but not in w′′. As a result, for this choice of q, we have (M,w) ⊧
◊a(q∧χ)∧¬◻a(χ→ q), contradicting the fact that (M,w) ⊧ ∀q(◊a(q∧χ)→ ◻a(χ→ q)).
It follows that the assumption of such w′ and w′′ existing must be false, so there is at1180
most one a-successor w′ of w such that (M,w′) ⊧ χ.
Suppose then that there is exactly one a-successor w′ of w such that (M,w′) ⊧ χ.
Then there is at least one such successor, so (M,w) ⊧ ◊aχ. Furthermore, for every
assignment of q, we have ◊a(q ∧ χ) if and only if (M,w
′) ⊧ q ∧ χ, in which case we also
have ◻a(χ → q). It follows that (M,w) ⊧ ∀q(◊a(q ∧ χ) → ◻a(χ → q)). Together with1185
the previously established (M,w) ⊧ ◊aχ, this implies that (M,w) ⊧ ψunique(a,χ).
Now we can use ψunique to define ψmodel and f .
Definition 48. The formula ψmodel is given by
ψmodel ∶= ◻a (ψD ∧ ψexcl ∧ ψconnect ∧ ψ≥1 ∧ ψ≤1)
where
ψD ∶= pD ∧ ψunique(b, pD)
ψexlc ∶= ◻b ¬(pD ∧ (start ∨ end)) ∧ ◻b¬(start ∧ end) ∧ ◻b(pD ∨ start ∨ end)
ψconnect ∶= ◻b (¬pD → (◻a(start ∨ end) ∧ ψunique(a, start) ∧ ψunique(a, end)))
ψ≥1 ∶=∀p(◊ap→ ◊b(pstart ∧ ◊a(pend ∧ ◊bp))
ψ≤1 ∶=∀p(ψunique(a, p)→ ψunique(b, start ∧ ◊a(end ∧ ◊b(p ∧ pD)))
The meaning of the named subformulas (ψD, ψexcl , ψconnect , ψ≥1 and ψ≤1) is discussed in
the proof of Theorem 50.
Definition 49. Let translation function f is recursively defined as follows.1190
f(x = y) = ◊a(px ∧ py)
f(R(x, y)) = ◊a(px ∧ ◊b(pR ∧ start ∧ ◊a(end ∧ ◊bpy)))
f(¬θ) = ¬f(θ)
f(θ1 → θ2) = f(θ1)→ f(θ2)
f(∀xθ) = ∀px(ψunique(a, px)→ f(θ))
f(∀Rθ) = ∀pRf(θ)
We can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 50. For every dso sentence θ,
⊧ θ iff Kefull ⊧ ψmodel → f(θ)
Proof. First, let us consider the models that satisfy ψmodel . Let (M,w0) be any
full epistemic pointed model such that (M,w0) ⊧ ψmodel , and let Dom ∶= Ra(w0). The
primary connective of ψmodel is ◻a, so let us consider any w ∈ Dom.1195
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The conjunct ψD holds at w if and only if (i) w satisfies pD and (ii) w has only one
b-successor that satisfies pD (and by (i) this unique successor has to be w itself). We
refer to the b-successors of w as the cone on w, as drawn in the following figure. Note
that cones of any two different w,w′ ∈ Dom cannot overlap, since by the fact that M
is an epistemic model, this would imply that Rb(w,w










The conjunct ψexcl holds if and only if every state in a cone satisfies exactly one of
pD, start and end . Now, consider ψconnect . It holds if and only if every ¬pD state in a
cone is connected by the relation a to exactly one state that satisfies start , to exactly1205
one state that satisfies end , and only to states that satisfy either start or end . We had
already established that no world in a cone can satisfy both start and end , so it follows
that every such ¬pD state is either a start state paired by a with an end state, or an end
state paired by a with a start state. Note that if a start or end state is in the cone of w,
then the state that it is paired up with could be in the cone of w, in the cone of some1210
different state w′ or it might not be in any cone at all.
Now, consider formula ψ≥1. It states that for every choice of p, if w has an a-successor






z→w′′ such that e1 satisfies start ,
e2 satisfies end and w
′′ satisfies p. This is the case if and only if for every w,w′ ∈D, there






z→ w′. Note that this also applies for w = w′.1215







































Finally, formula ψ≤1 states that for any choice of p, if w has a unique a-successor w′
that satisfies p, then w also has a unique b-successor e1 such that (i) e1 satisfies start ,
(ii) e1 has an a-successor e2 that satisfies end , and (iii) e2 has a b-successor w
′′ that1220
satisfies p ∧ pD. This is the case if and only if for every w,w







z→w′ where e1 satisfies start and e2 satisfies end .







z→w′ with (M, e1) ⊧ start and (M, e2) ⊧ end between each w,w′ ∈D.
The pointed model (M,w0) is then used in the following way. The suggestively1225
named set Dom can be treated as the domain of a dso model. First-order quantifi-
cation is then interpreted on selecting exactly one world w ∈ Dom. Note that this is
precisely what translation function f does: first-order quantification ∀xθ is translated
as ∀px(ψunique(a, px) → f(θ)). On the other hand, second-order quantification is inter-







where pair (w,w′) is in the chosen relation. Again, this is exactly what translation f
does: ∀Rθ is translated as ∀pRf(θ), and the relational atom R(x, y) is then translated
as ◊a(px ∧ ◊b(pR ∧ start ∧ ◊a(end ∧ ◊bpy))), which means exactly that R(x, y) holds iff
pR is true in the start-world in between the unique px- and py-worlds.
It follows that Dom ⊧ θ if and only if (M,w0) ⊧ f(θ). Since all we assumed about1235
M is that it is a full epistemic model and that (M,w0) ⊧ ψmodel , it follows that ⊧ θ if
and only if Kefull ⊧ ψmodel → f(θ).
As a consequence of the fact that validity in dso is not recursively enumerable, we
immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 51. Multi-agent sopml on full epistemic frames is unaxiomatisable.1240
Remark 52. We used only two indices for modalities in our reduction, so the unax-
iomatisability result holds whenever the set of indices contains at least two elements.
4.2.2. Single-agent sopml∗ is Unaxiomatisable on Modal Frames
In Section 4.1.3 we introduced sound and complete axiomatisations for sopml on
the classes of modal, boolean, and all frames. The version of sopml that we considered1245
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there does not contain common knowledge, however. This is a fundamental restriction;
the variant sopml∗, which is obtained by adding common knowledge to sopml, is not
axiomatisable on any class of frames. Here, we show that sopml∗ is not axiomatisable
with respect to general or epistemic models that have modal, boolean or arbitrary domain
of quantification. It can also be shown that sopml∗ is unaxiomatisable on intermediate1250
classes of models, such as those for logics KD45 (i.e., serial, transitive and symmetric
models) or S4.2 (i.e., reflexive, transitive and convergent models). We do not include
proofs for these classes, however, since they are very similar to the proofs for the cases
we treat.
We prove the unaxiomatisability of sopml∗ on modal models by a reduction from the1255
non-halting problem to the validity problem of sopml∗. Since the non-halting Turing
machines are not recursively enumerable, neither are the validities of sopml∗ with respect
to modal models. The proof that we use here is inspired by a similar proof from [38],
in which the non-halting problem is reduced to the validity problem of a logic called
Arbitrary Arrow Update Logic with Common Knowledge.1260
Before defining our reduction, let us first define the non-halting problem for Turing
machines. A Turing machine, first defined in [50], is an abstract model of computation
that consists of (i) an infinite tape, with Z cells that can each contain a symbol, but that
initially contain a “null” symbol α0; (ii) a read/write head that can read the symbol in
a cell or write a symbol to it; (iii) a method to keep track of what state the machine1265
is currently in; and (iv) a set of instructions that, based on the current state and the
current symbol under the read/write head, determines what symbol is to be written,
what the next state of the machine should be, and whether the read/write head should
move to the left, to the right or remain in place. The Turing machines that we consider
here are deterministic so for each combination of state and symbol there is exactly one1270
instruction. Formally, a Turing machine T can be defined as follows.
Definition 53. A Turing machine T is a triple T = (Λ, S,∆), where Λ is a finite alphabet
containing the symbol α0, S is a finite set of states containing the distinct states s0 and
send , and ∆ ∶ Λ × S → Λ × S × {left , right , remain} is a transition function.
The functions ∆1,∆2 and ∆3 are the projections of ∆ to its first, second and third1275
coordinate, respectively.
We can assume without loss of generality that ∆2(α, s) /= s0 for all α ∈ Λ and s ∈ S,
so that the machine never returns to its initial state.4 The execution of such a machine
T can be represented as a function ET ∶ Z × N → Λ × S × {yes,no}. The horizontal
direction Z represents positions on the tape. The vertical direction N represents time.1280
So ET (n,m) = (α, s, yes) indicates that at time m, the n-th position on the tape contains
symbol α, the machine is in state s and the read/write head is in position n. Likewise,
ET (n,m) = (α, s,no) indicates that at time m the read/write head is not at position
n. Note that ET contains some redundant information: the state is a property of the
machine, not of any particular position on the tape. Furthermore, the read/write head1285
is in exactly one position at a time. So, for example, if ET (n,m) = (α, s, yes), then we
must have ET (n + 1,m) = (β, s,no) for some symbol β.
4Where necessary, an extra copy scopy0 of s0 can be added; whenever the system would go to state s0
we can then let it go to scopy0 instead.
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A Turing machine T has a designated end state send . We say that T halts if the
machine ever reaches this end state, so if for any (n,m) and any α ∈ Λ, we have
ET (n,m) = (α, send , yes).1290
Definition 54 (Halting Problem). The halting problem is to determine, for a given
Turing machine T , whether T halts. The non-halting problem is the complement of the
halting problem, i.e., to determine whether a given Turing machine doesn’t halt.
Although neither of them used this terminology, Church [13] and Turing [50] indepen-
dently showed that the halting problem is undecidable. More precisely, the halting Turing1295
machines are recursively enumerable, but the non-halting Turing machines are not.
Remark 55. The intuition behind the end state is that the machine stops when it reaches
send , so no more computation happens after that point. Here, however, in order to avoid
special cases it is more convenient to assume that every Turing machine keeps going
forever, whether or not it reaches send . So, whether or not a machine formally halts1300
(reaches the end state), it never informally halts (stops).
When reducing the non-halting problem to validity in sopml∗, it is useful to represent
time not by the naturals N but by the integers Z, since this allows us to avoid special
cases at time t = 0. For every time t < 0 we then say that the machine is in a dummy
state svoid /∈ S, which can be read as “the computation has not started yet.”1305
Now that the necessary concepts are defined, we can give our reduction of the non-
halting problem to the validity problem of sopml∗ on modal frames. This reduction has
three parts. Firstly, we define a sopml∗ formula ψgrid that holds in a pointed model
(M,w) if and only if M represents a Z × Z grid. Then, we define a formula ψsane
that enforces a few sanity constraints that are necessary in order for us to interpret the1310
grid as representing the execution of some Turing machine. Finally, we define a formula
ψT that holds if and only if the Turing machine encoded by the grid is the specific
machine T . Before defining these formulas, however, let us explain a “trick” that we will
use. Typically, if we wanted to have a Z × Z grid in a modal logic, we would use four
accessibility relations Rright ,Rleft ,Rup and Rdown . However, we also want to show that1315
even single-agent sopml∗ is unaxiomatisable. So we will use only a single relation R.
We still need to represent the four possible directions, however. We do this by “col-




So if a world satisfies 5, then the world above it satisfies 8, and if a world satisfies 6
then the world to its right satisfies 4. For ever direction x ∈ dir ∶= {left , right ,up,down},
let fx ∶ {1,⋯,9} → {1,⋯,9} be the function that gives the next number in direction
x, e.g. fup(8) = 2. Further, since we use only one agent a, we write ◻ for ◻a. This




(i ∧ ◻(fx(i)→ φ))
◊xφ ∶= ⋁
1≤i≤9
(i ∧ ◊(fx(i) ∧ φ))
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ψgrid ∶= ◻

















(i ∧ ◻ ⋁
x∈dir
fx(i))
uniquex ∶= ∀p(◊xp→ ◻xp))
inversexy ∶=∀p(p→ ◻x ◻y p)
commutexy ∶=∀p(◊x◊yp→ ◻y ◻x p)
dir ∶= {left , right ,up,down}
inv dir ∶= {(left , right), (right , left), (up,down), (down,up)}
perp dir ∶= {(left ,up), (left ,down), (right ,up), (right ,down),
(up, left), (up, right), (down, left), (down, right)}
Table 5: The formula ψgrid .
These abbreviations are then used in formulas ψgrid , ψsane and ψT defined as follows.
Definition 56. Let S,Λ,{pos, rpos, rpos} ⊆ AP , and let T = (Λ, S,∆) be a Turing ma-
chine. The formula χT is given as χT ∶= ψgrid ∧ ψsane ∧ ψT ∧ s0 ∧ pos, where formulas
ψgrid , ψsane and ψT are as shown in Tables 5–7.1320
The formulas ψgrid , ψsane and ψT may look complex, but that it slightly misleading.
While these formulas are certainly long, every named subformula encodes a property of
either a grid or a Turing machine in a rather straightforward way.
We start by considering the formula ψgrid which, as the name implies, encodes a
grid. Specifically, let (M,w0) be any pointed model (based on a modal frame) such1325
that (M,w0) ⊧ ψgrid . We use the worlds of M to represent the points of Z × Z, in the
following way: (i) the world w0 represents (0,0); (ii) if a world w represents (n,m), then
every right-successor of w represents (n + 1,m); and (iii) similarly for the other three
directions.
We show that every point (n,m) is represented by at least one world, that every1330
world in the generated submodel represents at least one point, and that all the worlds
that represent a single point (n,m) are modally indistinguishable. Let w be any world
in the generated submodel of (M,w0). The main connective of ψgrid is ◻
∗, so labels,
direction, uniquex for every x ∈ dir , inversexy for every (x, y) ∈ inv dir and commutexy
for all (x, y) ∈ perp dir hold at w.1335
• By labels, the world w satisfies exactly one label i ∈ {1,⋯,9}.
• By the first conjunct of direction, the world w has at least one x-successor for every
x ∈ dir . It follows that every point in Z × Z is represented by at least one world.
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Furthermore, by the second conjunct of direction, every successor of w satisfies one
of the labels that allow us to identify it as an x-successor for some x ∈ dir . It1340
follows that every world in the generated submodel represents at least one point.
• The formula uniquex implies that, for every U in the domain of quantification D,
either every x-successor of w is in U , or no x-successor is in U . SinceM is based on
a modal frame, this implies that all x-successors of w are modally indistinguishable
from one another.1345
• The formula inversexy implies that, for every U ∈ D, if w ∈ U then every xy-
successor of w is also in U . Again, sinceM is based on a modal frame, this implies
that w is modally indistinguishable from its xy-successors. Note that this formula
holds for all (x, y) ∈ inv dir .
• The formula commutexy implies that, for every U ∈ D, if there is an xy-successor1350
w′ of w such that w′ ∈ U , then every yx-successor of w is in U . This implies that
the xy-successors of w are modally indistinguishable from its yx-successors.
• Taken together, uniquex (for every x ∈ dir), inversexy (for every (x, y) ∈ inv dir)
and commutexy (for every (x, y) ∈ perp dir) imply that all worlds representing a
single point (n,m) are modally indistinguishable from one another.1355
We say that tape position n at time m contains the symbol α if the worlds representing
(n,m) satisfy the propositional atom α. Likewise, if the worlds representing (n,m) satisfy
the propositional atom s, then the machine is in state s at time m. Finally, if the worlds
representing (n,m) satisfy the atom pos, then the read/write head is in position n at
time m, if they satisfy rpos then position n is to the right of the read/write head at time1360
m and if they satisfy lpos then position n is to the left of the head.
Note that, because all worlds representing (n,m) are modally indistinguishable, it
does not matter at which world we check whether these atoms are true; if s holds in any
world representing (n,m) then s holds on all worlds representing (n,m). In particular,
since we use propositional atoms to represent the state of the Turing machine, the symbols1365
on the tape, as well as the position of the read/write head, the modal indistinguishability
of all worlds representing (n,m) means that all those worlds agree on the symbol, state,
and on whether the read/write head is in that position. If a modal formula φ holds on
the worlds that represent (n,m), we abuse notation by writing (M, (n,m)) ⊧ φ.5
The formula ψsane imposes a number of sanity constraints: if (M,w) satisfies both1370
ψgrid and ψsane , then M can almost be seen as the execution of a Turing machine. We
will first discuss the subformulas of ψsane in detail, and explain which sanity constraints
they represent. After that, we will briefly discuss why ψsane only guarantees thatM can
almost be seen as the execution of a Turing machine.
As with ψgrid , the main connective of ψsane is ◻
∗. So suppose (M,w0) ⊧ ψgrid∧ψsane ,1375
and let w be any world in the generated submodel of (M,w0).
5Note that we have not shown that w represents a unique point (n,m). It is, in fact, true that if
(M,w0) ⊧ χT then every world in the generated submodel represents exactly one point, but we do not
need this fact so we will not prove it here.
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ψsane ∶= ◻
∗ (position1 ∧ position2 ∧ one state ∧ same state ∧ one symbol∧
void state ∧ initial symbol ∧ unchanged i)
position1 ∶= ¬(pos ∧ lpos) ∧ ¬(pos ∧ rpos) ∧ ¬(rpos ∧ lpos)
position2 ∶= ((pos ∨ rpos)→ ◻rightrpos) ∧ ((pos ∨ lpos)→ ◻left lpos))





same state ∶= ⋀
s∈states
(s→ (◻rights ∧ ◻lefts))





void state ∶= (s0 ∨ svoid)→ ◻downsvoid
initial symbol ∶= s0 → α0
unchanged ∶= ⋀
α∈Λ
((¬pos ∧ α)→ ◻upα))
Table 6: The formula ψsane .
• The formula position1 implies that the grid points represented by w being (i) the
location of the read/write head, (ii) to the right of the head, and (iii) to the left of
the head, are mutually exclusive.
• The formula position2 implies that if the point represented by w is either at the1380
read/write head or to its right, then w’s right-successor is to the right of the
read/write head, and similarly for the left side. Together with position1, this
implies that for every m ∈ Z, there is at most one n such that (M, (n,m)) ⊧ pos.
• The formula one state implies that there is exactly one state s such that (M,w) ⊧ s.
• The formula same state implies that w satisfies the same state as its left- and1385
right- successors. So for every time m, there is exactly one state s such that
(M, (n,m)) ⊧ s for all n.
• The formula one symbol implies that there is exactly one symbo l α such that
(M,w) ⊧ α.
• Recall that we use svoid as a dummy state which indicates that the execution of T1390
has not started yet. The formula void state implies that svoid holds on all worlds
below worlds that satisfy either s0 or svoid , so svoid does indeed hold in all worlds
that represent points before the execution of T started in s0.
• The formula initial symbol guarantees that, in the initial state, the entire tape
contains the symbol α0.1395
• The formula symbol unchanged guarantees that whenever the read/write head is







(position change ∧ state change ∧ symbol change)
position change ∶= ⋀
{(s,α)∣∆3(s,α)=left}
((pos ∧ s ∧ α)→ ◻up ◻left pos)∧
⋀
{(s,α)∣∆3(s,α)=right}
((pos ∧ s ∧ α)→ ◻up ◻right pos)∧
⋀
{(s,α)∣∆3(s,α)=remain}
((pos ∧ s ∧ α)→ ◻uppos)




((pos ∧ s ∧ α)→ ◻ups
′)




((pos ∧ s ∧ α)→ ◻upβ)
Table 7: The formula ψT .
The above is almost sufficient to show thatM represents the execution of some Turing
machine, except for the following: (i) there is no guarantee that s0 is satisfied anywhere,1400
so the execution might never start; (ii) while the read/write head is guaranteed to be in
at most one position, it is not guaranteed to be in at least position at all times; and (iii)
the symbols that are written, the state changes, and the movement of the read/write
head could be random, as opposed to fully determined by a set of rules. Whereas ψsane
almost guarantees that M can be seen as the execution of some Turing machine, the1405
formula ψT narrows this down to the specific machine T . In the process, it also solves
one of the problems that remained after considering ψsane .
Suppose that (M,w0) ⊧ χT , so in addition to (M,w0) ⊧ ψgrid ∧ ψsane we also have
(M,w0) ⊧ ψT ∧ s0 ∧ pos. Then, the subformula position change in ψT guarantees that
the read/write head moves in accordance with ∆3, the subformula state change guaran-1410
tees that the state changes in accordance with ∆2, and the subformula symbol change
guarantees that the symbol that is written on the tape by the read/write head is in
accordance with ∆1. Note that this solves problem (iii) of ψsane : the movement, state
changes, and written symbols are in accordance with the deterministic set of rules that
is represented by ∆.1415
Finally, consider the conjuncts s0 and pos in χT . These solve the other two problems
of ψsane : the execution starts at state s0 in the point represented by w0, which represent
point (0,0). Furthermore, the read/write head starts there as well, so the read/write head
is initially in at least one position. From the fact that the head moves deterministically,
and that this is encoded in ψT , it then follows that the read/write head is also in at least1420
one position at every time after m = 0.
To conclude, the above shows that if (M,w0) ⊧ χT , then the generated submodel of
(M,w0) represents a grid, and this grid contains the encoding of an execution of T .
Theorem 57. A Turing machine T is halting if and only if Kmodal ⊧ χT → ◊
∗send , and
non-halting if and only Kmodal ⊧ χT → ◻
∗¬send .1425
Proof. Let (M,w0) be any pointed model such that (M,w0) ⊧ χT . Then, as shown
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above, every world in the generated submodel represents some point (n,m) in a Z × Z
grid and, furthermore, the worlds representing a point (n,m) satisfy s ∈ S if and only
if the system is in state s at time m. It follows that the generated submodel contains a
send world if and only if T is halting, from which the theorem follows immediately.1430
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 57, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 58. sopml∗ is not axiomatisable on modal frames for any number of agents.
This unaxiomatisability result can be extended to the classes of boolean and all frames,
since the modal frames can be characterized inside boolean or any frame. Let φ¬ ∶=
∀p∃q ◻∗ (¬p ↔ q), φ∨ ∶= ∀p∀q∃r ◻∗ ((p ∨ q) ↔ r) and φ◻ ∶= ⋀a∈Ag ∀p∃q ◻∗ (◻ap ↔ q).1435
The following lemma is entirely straightforward, so we state it without proof.
Lemma 59. Let (M,w) be a pointed model based on any frame. Then, the generated
submodel of (M,w) is based on a modal frame if and only if (M,w) ⊧ φ¬ ∧ φ∨ ∧ φ◻.
Hence, the following corollary follows immediately from Lemma 59.
Corollary 60. A formula φ ∈ Lsopml is valid on modal frames if and only if (φ¬ ∧ φ∨ ∧1440
φ◻)→ φ is valid on all or boolean frames.
As a result of the unaxiomatisability of sopml∗ on modal frames, we finally obtain
unaxiomatisability for all classes of frames.
Corollary 61. sopml∗ is not axiomatisable neither on the class of all frames nor on
the class of boolean frames, for any number of agents.1445
So far, we have shown that sopml∗ is unaxiomatisable for modal, boolean, and all
frames. This result can be extended to the corresponding classes of epistemic frames as
well. The proofs for epistemic frames is very similar to the proofs above however, so we
include them in the appendix only.
Theorem 62. If ∣I ∣ ≥ 2, then the validities in sopml∗ over modal epistemic frames are1450
not recursively enumerable.
In particular, sopml∗ is not axiomatisable on the class of modal epistemic frames.
The same characterisation of boolean and all frames also applies to epistemic frames.
So we also have the following corollary.
Corollary 63. sopml∗ is not axiomatisable on the class of all or boolean epistemic1455
frames, for any number of agents.
5. Simulations and Bisimulation
In this section we investigate the expressive power of second-order propositional modal
logic by introducing truth-preserving (bi)simulation relations for sopml. Bisimulations
are an essential tool for the model theory of propositional modal logic, as they provide1460
non-trivial sufficient conditions under which two models satisfy the same formulas in
pml [7, 27]. Moreover, propositional modal logic is characterized by the well-known van
Benthem theorem as the bisimulation-invariant fragment of first-order logic [6]. Hereafter
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we introduce simulations and bisimulations for sopml and prove that they are indeed
truth-preserving. Further, in Section 5.2 we present a notion of abstraction for frames1465
and show that an abstraction of a frame simulates that frame. Finally, in Section 5.3 we
provide examples of the application of (bi)simulations to the analysis of the expressive
power of sopml in spatial and temporal reasoning.
We should note that SOPML (bi)simulations are somewhat less well behaved than
PML bisimulations. In particular, given two PML models there is a unique greatest1470
bisimulation between the two. Furthermore, this greatest bisimulation is the bisimilarity
relation, and can also be characterized as the greatest fixed point of a partition refinement
operator. In contrast, between two SOPML models there need not be a unique greatest
bisimulation, see Example 72. While we could define a partition refinement operator like
in the PML case, and any bisimulation would be a fixed point of this operator, it would1475
not have a unique greatest fixed point. The SOPML bisimilarity relation, meanwhile, is
not guaranteed to be a bisimulation itself.
5.1. Simulations and Bisimulations
We define the notion of (bi)simulations on frames, although it is immediate to extend
this definition to models. In the rest of the section we consider frames F = ⟨W,D,R⟩, F ′ =1480
⟨W ′,D′,R′⟩, and models M = ⟨F , V ⟩, M′ = ⟨F ′, V ′⟩ defined on F and F ′ respectively.
In the following, Σ denotes a relation Σ ⊆D ×D.
Definition 64 (Frame Simulation). Given frames F and F ′, a simulation is a pair
(σ,Σ) of relations ∅ ≠ σ ⊆W ×W ′, Σ ⊆ D ×D′ such that (i) for every U ∈ D, Σ(U,U ′)
for some U ′ ∈D′; and (ii) σ(w,w′) implies1485
1. for every v ∈W , a ∈ I, if Ra(w, v) then σ(v, v
′) for some v′ ∈ R′a(w
′);
2. for every U ∈D, U ′ ∈D′, Σ(U,U ′) implies w ∈ U iff w′ ∈ U ′.
Notice that condition 1 in Definition 64 expresses the standard notion of simulation
in pml. Hence, simulations for sopml extend the corresponding definition for pml (we
devote more discussion to this point later on). The definition of simulation above differs1490
from a similar notion put forward in [4]. Specifically, in [4] only a relation on states is
considered, thus obtaining a strictly weaker notion.
We say that state w′ simulates w, or w ⪯ w′, iff σ(w,w′) holds for some simulation
pair (σ,Σ). Similarly, a set U ′ simulates U , or U ⪯ U ′, iff Σ(U,U ′) holds for some
simulation pair (σ,Σ). Note that it may be that w ≺ w′ holds because of (σ1,Σ1)1495
and U ≺ U ′ holds because of (σ2,Σ2), while (σ1,Σ2) is not a simulation pair. To see
this, consider the frames G1 = ⟨{w1,w2},{{w1},{w2}},{(w1,w2), (w2,w1)}⟩ and G2 =
⟨{x1, x2},{{x1},{x2}},{(x1, x2), (x2, x1)}⟩. Clearly, w1 ⪯ x1 and {w1} ⪯ {x2}. However,
it is not the case that w1 ∈ {w1} iff x1 ∈ {x2}. Nonetheless, each ⪯ is a preorder, i.e., a
reflexive and transitive relation. Finally, a frame F ′ simulates F , or F ⪯ F ′, iff for every1500
w ∈W , w ⪯ w′ for some w′ ∈W ′.
Observe that for pml (that is, whenever we ignore the quantification domain D),
the notion of simulation given on frames is vacuous, as we discard the evaluation of
propositional atoms in the various states. Then, for instance, all serial frames simulate
each other. However, this remark does not apply to sopml, as we also have to take into1505
account propositional quantification.





























Figure 3: frames G and G′ in Example 65. D components are omitted for clarity.
Example 65. Consider frames G = ⟨W,R,D⟩ and G′ = ⟨W ′,R′,D′⟩ over set I = {a, b, c}
of indices, depicted in Figure 3, with
• W = {w1,w2,w3};1510
• Ra = {(w1,w3), (w3,w1)}, Rb = {(w1,w2), (w2,w1)}, Rc = {(w2,w3), (w3,w2)};
• D = {{w1},{w2},{w3}};
• W ′ = {us ∣ s is a finite sequence on {1,2,3} starting with 1, with no adjacent
repetition};
• for every i ∈ I, R′i = {(us, us′) ∣ s
′ = s ⋅m and Ri(wlast(s),wm)};1515
• let U ′n = {us ∣ last(s) = n}, then D





Intuitively, frame G can be thought of as a scenario where robots a, b, and c move
around locations w1, w2, w3 (robot a moves between w1 and w3, etc.) Frame G
′ then
captures the same scenario but with the additional possibility to reason about some notion
of history, or time (one might for instance add an atom pi which is true exactly at nodes1520
at level i. To do this, one needs to make appropriate assumptions about D′ in G′, like
requiring that the frame is full. We do not consider these matters further.)
Now consider the pair (σ,Σ) of relations σ ⊆ W ×W ′ and Σ ⊆ D × D′ such that
σ(wn, us) holds iff last(s) = n and Σ({wn}, U
′
m) holds iff n = m. We check that (σ,Σ)
is indeed a simulation. Firstly, for every {wn} ∈ D, we have Σ({wn}, U
′
n) for Un ∈1525
D′. Secondly, if σ(wn, us) and Ri(wn,wm), then s′ = s ⋅ m is such that R′i(us, us′)
and σ(wm, us′). Thirdly, if σ(wn, us) and Σ({wk}, U
′
m), then last(s) = n and k = m.
Therefore, wn ∈ {wk} iff n = k, iff last(s) =m, iff us ∈ U
′
m.
Finally, we observe that for every wn ∈W , σ(wn, us) for last(s) = n. Thus, frame G
′
simulates G.1530
Lemma 66. We have the following regarding the relation between simulations and prop-
erties of frames.
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1. It can be checked in NPTIME whether there exists a simulation relation between
two frames.
2. If a frame F ′ simulates a boolean (respectively modal, full) frame F , then F ′ need1535
not to be boolean (respectively modal, full). Nor does F ′ being boolean (modal, full)
imply that F is also boolean (modal, full).
Proof. As regards the first point, observe that we can guess a pair (σ,Σ) of relations
on states and sets respectively, and then check in polynomial time whether it is actually
a frame simulation.1540
As to the second point, consider that a simulating frame F ′ may contain sets of
states that do not simulate any state in F , which are not closed under set-theoretic op-
erations. As an example, consider frames F = {{w1,w2},{(w1,w2)},2
{w1,w2}} and F ′ =
{{u1, u2, u3, u4},{(u1, u2), (u1, u3), (u1, u4)},{{u1},{u2, u3},{u1, u2, u3},{u4},∅}}. In
particular, F ′ is a simulation of F with relations σ and Σ such that σ(w1, u1), σ(w2, u2),1545
σ(w2, u3), and Σ({w1},{u1}), Σ({w2},{u2, u3}), Σ({w1,w2},{u1, u2, u3}), Σ(∅,∅). But
F is a full frame, while F ′ is not even boolean.
The other implication can be proved by a similar line of reasoning. Specifically,
consider frame F ′′ = {{v1, v2},{(v1, v2)},{{w1},{w2}}}. Now F ′′ is simulated by F with
relations σ and Σ such that σ(v1,w1), σ(v2,w2), and Σ({v1},{w1}), Σ({v2},{w2}). But1550
F ′′ is not even boolean.
Thus, similar frames do not necessarily belong to the same class. Below we compare
these results with those available for bisimulations.
We now state the following preservation result for the universal fragment of sopml.
Theorem 67. If w ⪯ w′, then for every ϕ ∈ L∗a−sopml ,1555
(F ′,w′) ⊧ ϕ implies (F ,w) ⊧ ϕ
Proof. Since w ⪯ w′, there is a simulation pair (σ,Σ) such that σ(w,w′). Fix
this σ. One can prove by induction on ϕ that if (F , V,w) /⊧ ϕ for some assignment
V , then (F ′,Σ(V ),w′) /⊧ ϕ, where Σ(V ) is any assignment V ′ such that for every p ∈
AP , Σ(V (p), V ′(p)). We only show the step for the quantifier. We write Σ(V )(p) for
(Σ(V ))(p). By clause (i) of Definition 64, Σ(V )(p) ∈D′.1560
For ϕ = ∀pψ, (F , V,w) /⊧ ϕ iff for some U ∈ D, (F , V pU ,w) /⊧ ψ. By induction
hypothesis, (F ′,Σ(V pU ),w
′) /⊧ ψ. By condition (i) in Definition 64, for U ∈ D, Σ(U,U ′)
for some U ′ ∈ D′. In particular, we have that Σ(V pU ) = Σ(V )
p
U ′ whenever Σ(U,U
′), and
therefore (F ′,Σ(V )pU ′ ,w
′) /⊧ ψ for U ′ ∈D′, that is, (F ′,Σ(V ),w′) /⊧ ϕ.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 67 we obtain the following corollary.1565
Corollary 68. If F ⪯ F ′, then for every ϕ ∈ L∗a−sopml ,
F ′ ⊧ ϕ implies F ⊧ ϕ
Thus, the notion of simulation introduced in Definition 64 preserves the universal
fragment of sopml, similarly to the case for standard simulations and pml.
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Example 69. Consider again frames G and G′ in Example 65. We showed that G′





which intuitively says that the agents can only move to a different position (so they cannot
choose to remain in the same state). By Corollary 68 we deduce that (14) is valid in G1570
as well.
Simulations can naturally be extended to bisimulations. Also in this case, our focus
is at the level of frames. In the following the converse of a relation R is the relation
R−1 = {(u, v) ∣ R(v, u)}.
Definition 70 (Frame Bisimulation). Given frames F and F ′, a bisimulation is a1575
pair (ω,Ω) of relations ∅ /= ω ⊆W ×W ′, Ω ⊆D×D′ such that both (ω,Ω) and (ω−1,Ω−1)
are simulations. That is, (i) for every U ∈ D, Ω(U,U ′) for some U ′ ∈ D′, and for every
U ′ ∈D′, Ω(U,U ′) for some U ∈D′; and (ii) ω(w,w′) implies
1. for every v ∈W , a ∈ I, if Ra(w, v) then ω(v, v
′) for some v′ ∈ R′a(w
′);
2. for every v′ ∈W ′, a ∈ I, if R′a(w
′, v′) then ω(v, v′) for some v ∈ Ra(w);1580
3. for every U ∈D, U ′ ∈D′, Ω(U,U ′) implies w ∈ U iff w′ ∈ U ′.
States w and w′ are bisimilar, or w ≈ w′, iff ω(w,w′) holds for some bisimulation pair
(ω,Ω). Similarly, sets U ′ and U are bisimilar, or U ≈ U ′, iff Ω(U,U ′) holds for some
bisimulation pair (ω,Ω). Again, similarly to the case for simulations, the pair (≈,≈) is
not necessarily a bisimulation (see Example 72), but each ≈ is an equivalence relation.1585
This is in contrast to the situation in pml, where the bisimilarity relation is itself a
bisimulation. Finally, frames F and F ′ are bisimilar, or F ≈ F ′, iff (i) for every w ∈W ,
w ≈ w′ for some w′ ∈W ′; and (ii) for every w′ ∈W ′, w ≈ w′ for some w ∈W .
Example 71. Notice that frames G and G′ in Example 65 are actually bisimilar. To
prove this fact, we show that the converse relations σ−1 ⊆ W ′ ×W and Σ−1 ⊆ D′ × D1590
form a simulation pair. Firstly, for every U ′n ∈ D
′, the set U = {wn} ∈ D is such that
Σ(U,U ′). Secondly, if σ−1(us,wn) and R′i(us, us′) then last(s) = n and s
′ = s ⋅m for
wm ∈W such that Ri(wn,wm). Hence, σ
−1(us′ ,wm). As to (3), the proof is identical as
for simulations.
Example 72. Let frames H and H′ be as in Figure 4, where the domain of H is given1595
by D = {{w1,w3},{w2,w3}} and the domain of H
′ is given by D′ = {{x1, x2},{x2}}.
Now, take ω1 = {(w1, x1), (w3, x3)}, Ω1 = {({w1,w3},{x1, x2}), ({w2,w3},{x2})}, ω2 =
{(w2, x1), (w3, x2)} and Ω2 = {({w1,w3},{x2}), ({w2,w3},{x1, x2})}.
The pairs (ω1,Ω1) and (ω2,Ω2) are both bisimulations. Furthermore, it is easy to
verify that for every i ∈ {1,2} and every bisimulation (ω,Ω), if ωi ⊆ ω and Ωi ⊆ Ω, then1600
(ω,Ω) = (ωi,Ωi). In other words, (ω1,Ω1) and (ω2,Ω2) are maximal bisimulations.
So, there is no unique greatest bisimulation. Furthermore, note that w1 ≈ x1 and
w2 ≈ x1, yet there is no bisimulation that relates both w1 and w2 with x1. In particular,








Figure 4: frames H and H′ in Example 72. D components are omitted for clarity.
We now state the following adaptation of Lemma 66.1605
Lemma 73.
1. It can be checked in NPTIME whether there exists a bisimulation relation between
two frames.
2. Let F and F ′ be frames and let w and w′ be worlds of F and F ′, respectively, such
that w ≈ w′. Then Fw is boolean (respectively modal) iff F ′w′ is. However, if Fw is1610
full, then F ′w′ need not be full.
Moreover, if Fw and F
′
w′ are full, then they are isomorphic.
With regard to point 1, note that, as with simulations, we can simply guess a pair
(ω,Ω) and check in polynomial time whether it is a bisimulation. A proof of point 2 is
included in the appendix1615
Compare the situation for bisimulations with the weaker results available in Lemma 66
for simulations. Specifically, bisimulations preserve the class of boolean and modal
frames. Moreover, in the case of full frames, bisimulations collapse into isomorphisms.
We now state the main preservation result of this section. Its proof is similar to that
of Theorem 67, and it is in the appendix.1620
Theorem 74. If w ≈ w′, then for every formula ϕ ∈ L∗sopml ,
(F ,w) ⊧ ϕ iff (F ′,w′) ⊧ ϕ.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 74 we obtain the following.
Corollary 75. If F ≈ F ′, then for every ϕ ∈ L∗sopml ,
F ⊧ ϕ iff F ′ ⊧ ϕ
We can now infer that bisimulations in sopml are ‘stronger’ than the corresponding
notion for pml: whereas we noticed that the frames of Figure 2 are bisimilar in pml, as1625
a consequence of Theorem 74, and Example 10, which says that the frames do not agree
on formula (8), we conclude that they are not bisimilar in the sopml sense.
Example 76. We now consider two graph-theoretic properties. First, the notion of 3-
colorability, as formalised by the following sopml formula, where operator ◻ is interpreted
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as the necessity operator for the edges E ⊆ W 2 of a graph G = ⟨W,E⟩, while ◻∗ is, as
usual, the necessity operator for the reflexive and transitive closure of E:
∃p1, p2, p3 (◻
∗(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ p3) ∧ ◻∗⋀
i≠j
¬(pi ∧ pj) ∧ ⋀
1,2,3
◻∗(pi → ¬◇ pi)) (15)
The truth of (15) in a vertex v ∈ G implies that (i) all vertices in the subgraph
generated by v are coloured by either p1, p2, or p3; (ii) each vertex has at most one colour;
and (iii) no two adjacent vertices have the same colour. Thus, the subgraph generated1630
by v is 3-colorable. Observe that frame G in Figure 3(a) is indeed 3-colorable, and since
states w1 and u1 are bisimilar, as an immediate consequence of Theorem 74, also frame
G′ is 3-colorable. Notice that the truth of (15) implies that the graph is 3-colorable, while
the converse holds only for full frames.
To illustrate further the (in)expressivity of sopml through simulations, we consider1635
one more graph-theoretic property: the existence of a Hamiltonian path, i.e., a path
that visits all vertices in a graph exactly once. Again, frame G in Figure 3(a) has a
Hamiltonian path w1,w2,w3. Now consider the finite graph G
′′ which is obtained from G
and G′ in Figure 3 as follows. In G′ replace the worlds u12 and u13 by a copy of w2 and
w3 from G respectively, and remove all the worlds different from u1. It is not difficult to1640
see that G′′ is bisimilar with G, but does not allow a Hamiltonian path.
Proposition 77. The property of having a Hamiltonian path is not expressible in sopml.
Proposition 77 follows directly from the second part of Example 76 and it implies
that such paths are not expressible under the general semantics. Proposition 77 also
follows from [42, Corollary 7.24], which says that it is impossible to test in mso whether1645
a graph is Hamiltonian. Indeed, it is known that such property is expressible in the
language mso2, an extension of mso, which is strictly more expressive than sopml [15,
Prop. 5.13].
Discussion. We now compare our definition of (bi)simulation for sopml, with the
standard notion of (bi)simulation for pml [7]. Observe that if a frame F ′ simulates F1650
in sopml, with simulation pair (σ,Σ), then for every model M = ⟨F , V ⟩ based on F ,
modelM′ = ⟨F ′,Σ(V )⟩ on F ′ pml-simulatesM. In particular, if σ(w,w′) then for every
v ∈ W , a ∈ I, Ra(w, v) implies that σ(v, v
′) for some v′ ∈ R′a(w
′) by condition (ii).1 in
Definition 64. Moreover, w ∈ V (p) ∈ D iff w′ ∈ Σ(V )(p) ∈ D′ by conditions (i) and
(ii).2. Therefore, if M′ satisfies any universal formula φ in pml, then φ also holds in1655
M. Hence, Definition 64 of simulation for frames in sopml is indeed a generalisation
of the model-theoretic notion in pml. Furthermore, if frames F ′ and F are bisimilar in
sopml, with bisimulation pair (ω,Ω), then models M = ⟨F , V ⟩ and M′ = ⟨F ′,Ω(V )⟩
are also bisimilar in pml. Likewise, models M′ = ⟨F ′, V ′⟩ and M = ⟨F ,Ω−1(V )⟩ are
pml-bisimilar as well. So in this case too, sopml bisimulations on frames generalise pml1660
bisimulations on models.
5.2. Abstraction
This section is devoted to the definition of a notion of abstraction for Kripke frames.
Abstractions are deemed useful for system verification, as they allow to ignore some
selected features of the system, thus focusing only on the properties relevant for the1665
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verification task [14]. Indeed, a key fact about abstractions is that they simulate the
original system. Hereafter we prove such a result for sopml, starting with a family of
equivalence relations on states.
Definition 78 (Equivalence). Given a frame F , let ∼ be the equivalence relation on
W such that for every state w,w′ ∈ W , w ∼ w′ implies that for every U ∈ D, w ∈ U iff1670
w′ ∈ U . Further, denote by [w] = {w′ ∈W ∣ w′ ∼ w} the equivalence class of w in F , and
for a set U ⊆W , let [U] be {[w] ∣ w ∈ U}.
Clearly, if we replace ‘implies’ in Definition 78 by ‘iff’, we obtain the coarsest equiv-
alence relation satisfying the conditions in Definition 78.
Definition 79 (Abstraction). Given a frame F , the abstraction FA = ⟨WA,DA,RA⟩1675
of F (according to equivalence relation ∼ as in Definition 78) is the frame such that
• WA = {[w] ∣ w ∈W};
• DA = {[U] ∣ U ∈D};
• for every a ∈ I, RAa ([w], [w
′]) iff Ra(v, v′) for some v ∈ [w], v′ ∈ [w′].
Notice that the coarsest abstraction FA is finite whenever the interpretation domain1680
D in F is, and of size ∣WA∣ = O(2D) at most.
Example 80. To illustrate abstractions, we show that the frame G in Example 65 is
(isomorphic to) the coarsest abstraction G′A of G′. First of all, two worlds us and us′
are equivalent according to the coarsest equivalence ∼ iff for all U ′n ∈ D
′, us ∈ U ′n iff
us′ ∈ U
′
n, iff last(s) = last(s
′). So, in abstraction G′A we have three equivalence classes1685
[ut⋅1], [ut⋅2], and [ut⋅3], for sequences t ∈ {1,2,3}+ beginning with 1. As to the ac-
cessibility relations, R′Ai ([ut⋅n], [ut′⋅m]) iff for ut⋅n, ut′⋅m in W
′, R′i(ut⋅n, ut′⋅m), that is,
t′ = t⋅n and Ri(wn,wm). Hence, for instance, for agent a, we have R′Aa ([ut⋅1], [ut′⋅3]) and
R′Aa ([ut⋅3], [ut′⋅1]), as required. Finally, D




Clearly, the abstraction G′A of G′ is isomorphic to G, with mapping wi ↦ [ut⋅i] for1690
i = 1,2,3.
We now extend a standard result in modal logic, namely that abstractions are indeed
simulations, to sopml.
Lemma 81. Given a frame F with abstraction FA, the pair of mappings w ↦ [w] and
U ↦ [U] is a simulation.1695
Proof. We show that the pair (↦,↦) of mappings satisfies Definition 64. As
to condition (i), if U ∈ D then U ↦ [U] for [U] ∈ DA. Next, for (i).1 suppose that
Ra(w, v). Then, for [v] ∈ W
A we have that RAa ([w], [v]) and v ↦ [v]. Finally, as to
(ii).2, if w ↦ [w] and w ∈ U , then clearly [w] ∈ [U]. On the other hand, if [w] ∈ [U] then
for some v ∈ [w], v ∈ U . However, v ∈ [w] implies that v ∼ w. In particular, w ∈ U by the1700
constraint on ∼.
We remark that the abstraction FA of a full frame F is isomorphic to F . In fact, for
every w ∈W , the set {w} belongs to D, and since w ∼ w′ iff for all U ∈D, w ∈ U iff w′ ∈ U ,
w ∼ w′ implies in particular that w ∈ {w′}, that is, w = w′. As a consequence, w ↦ {w} is
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the only simulation on states between F and FA, and it is also an isomorphism. Further,1705
in Example 80 we observed that frame G is (isomorphic to) the coarsest abstraction of
G′. Hence, Lemma 81 provides an alternative proof of the fact that G simulates G′, that
we discussed in Example 71.
The following corollary follows immediately from Lemmas 67 and 81.
Corollary 82. Let F be a frame with abstraction FA. For every universal formula1710
ϕ ∈ L∗a−sopml ,
(FA, [w]) ⊧ ϕ implies (F ,w) ⊧ ϕ
The results presented above have an impact that goes beyond their theoretical inter-
est. As an example, we observed that relevant properties P of frames (such as reflexivity,
transitivity, symmetry, etc.) are definable in propositional modal logic in the sense that
for some formula φ in pml, a frame F validates φ iff F satisfies property P . In sopml1715
more properties become frame-definable within the class of full frames. For instance, in
Section 3 we showed that a full frame F is irreflexive iff F ⊧ ∃p(◻p ∧ ¬p). On the other
hand, whenever we consider the class of all frames, several properties are non-definable
(even where they might be definable in pml). For instance, the frame G in Example 65
is symmetric, while G′ is not. Since, G and G′ are bisimilar, and therefore satisfy the1720
same formulas in sopml, we conclude that symmetry is not definable in the class of
all frames. Likewise, irreflexivity nor reflexivity are definable on the class of all frames:














frames (F ,w) and (F ′,w′1) are bisimilar, but F is reflexive (hence reflexivity cannot be1725
expressed on all frames) while F ′ is irreflexive (hence irreflexivity cannot be expressed).
Such results provide us with further knowledge on the expressive power of sopml.
5.3. Bisimulations and Expressivity
In this section we explore the expressivity of sopml, also by using the (bi)simulations
introduced in Section 5.1. We focus on some temporal and spatial properties typically1730
used in artificial intelligence. In what follows we say that a property P is expressible in a
language L and class K of frames iff for some formula φ ∈ L, we have that for all F ∈ K,
F ⊧ φ iff F has property P . Sometimes we omit either L or K, whenever these are clear
from the context.
First of all, consider Dedekind-completeness of a total order ≤, i.e., a total, transitive,1735
and antisymmetric binary relation: a totally ordered set is Dedekind-complete if every
non-empty subset that has an upper bound, has a least upper bound. We recall that
the Dedekind-completeness of the real numbers is not expressible in pml: the proof
makes use of a propositional bisimulation between the structure (R,≤) of reals and the
rationals (Q,≤) [1]. Thus, by using simulations we immediately obtain the following1740
inexpressibility result.
Lemma 83. Dedekind-completeness is not expressible in the universal fragment La−sopml
in the class of full frames.
Proof. Clearly, the identity relation is a simulation between structures (Q,≤) and (R,≤
) seen as full frames, i.e., (Q,≤) ⪯ (R,≤), and if Dedekind-completeness were expressible1745
as a formula φ in a-sopml, (R,≤) ⊧ φ would imply (Q,≤) ⊧ φ, a contradiction.
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0 1 2 . . . w′
Figure 5: Frames G1 and G2. The D-components are omitted for clarity.
Recall that formula δ = (◇p ∧ ◇ ◻ ¬p) → ◇(◻−1 ◇ p ∧ ◻¬p) has been introduced
in Section 3.2 to express Dedekind-completeness. Intuitively, δ fails in (Q,≤) since, for
instance, the set {q ∈ Q ∣ q <
√
2} is non-empty and upper bounded, and therefore satisfies
the antecedent. However, it has no least upper bound to satisfy the consequent.1750
As a further example, we prove that neither finiteness nor infinity of the state space
W are expressible in boolean frames. This is in line with the situation in pml.
Lemma 84. In language L∗sopml neither finiteness nor infinity are expressible in the class
of boolean frames.
Proof. Consider frame G1 = ⟨N, succ,{N,∅}⟩ of the naturals with the successor relation1755
and the reflexive-point frame G2 = ⟨{w
′},{(w′,w′)},{{w′},∅}⟩ in Figure 5, which are
boolean by definition of D1 and D2. In particular, the relations ω mapping every natural
n ∈ N to w′, and Ω mapping N to {w′} and the empty set ∅ to itself, form a bisimulation
pair. Thus, G1 and G2 validate the same formulas in sopml. However, G1 is infinite while
G2 is finite.1760
To conclude our brief review of expressivity results in sopml, we show that for the
sublanguage of Lsopml without the reflexive and transitive closure operator ◻
∗, finiteness
is not even expressible in full frames. For n ∈ N, let [n] be the set {0, . . . , n}, Gn the
frame ⟨[n], succ,2[n]⟩, and GN = ⟨N, succ,2N⟩ the frame isomorphic to the structure of
natural numbers endowed with the successor relation. Both GN and each Gn are full. Let1765
G be the class of all frames Gn, for n ∈ N, and consider the following result.
Lemma 85. In language Lsopml the theory Th(G) is a subset of Th(GN).
Proof. Consider φ ∉ Th(GN) with finite modal depth k ∈ N, where the modal depth
is defined as in the propositional case, as the maximum nesting of modal operators [7].
We can assume without loss of generality that (GN, V,0) /⊧ φ for some assignment V . We1770
prove that (Gk, V
′,0) /⊧ φ, where assignment V ′ is such that V ′(p) = V (p)∩ [k] for every
p ∈ AP (since our frames are full, V (p) ∩ [k] is admissiable in Gk). More precisely we
prove, using induction on n, that if ψ is a subformula of φ of modal depth n ≤ k, then
for all ` with 0 ≤ ` ≤ k − n, it holds that (GN, V, `) ⊧ ψ iff (Gk, V
′, `) ⊧ ψ.
We start with the case for n = 0. If ψ is an atom p, then (GN, V, `) ⊧ ψ iff ` ∈ V (p),1775
iff ` ∈ V ′(p), iff (Gk, V ′, `) ⊧ ψ, for all 0 ≤ ` ≤ k. The cases for propositional connectives
are immediate. Finally, suppose ψ = ∃pχ, and that (∗) (GN, V, `) ⊧ χ iff (Gk, V
′, `) ⊧ χ
for all 0 ≤ ` ≤ k. Then (GN, V, `) ⊧ ψ implies that for some U ∈ D, (GN, V
p
U , `) ⊧ ψ.
Consider U ′ = U ∩ [k] ∈ D′. In particular, (V pU )
′ = V ′pU ′ . By (∗), (Gk, V
′p
U ′ , `) ⊧ χ, that is,
(Gk, V
′, `) ⊧ ψ.1780
Now suppose that ψ is a subformula of φ of modal depth n + 1 ≤ k, and let 0 ≤ ` ≤
k − (n + 1). Assume that ψ = ◇χ. Then, (GN, V, `) ⊧ ψ implies that (GN, V, ` + 1) ⊧ χ for
1 ≤ ` + 1 ≤ k − n. By induction hypothesis (Gk, V
′, ` + 1) ⊧ χ, that is, (Gk, V ′, `) ⊧ ψ. The
direction from from (Gk, V
′, `) to (GN, V, `) is similar, and the cases for the propositional
connectives and the quantifier go as before.1785
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Corollary 86. In language Lsopml finiteness is not expressible on full frames.
Proof. As a consequence of Lemma 85, (GN, V,0) /⊧ φ implies (Gk, V
′,0) /⊧ φ for some
k ∈ N, i.e., φ ∉ Th(G). Hence, if φ expressed ‘being finite’, then it would be valid in G,
and hence also in GN, a contradiction. Thus, finiteness is not expressible even in the class
of full frames.1790
In this section we made use of (bi)simulations to show that sopml can express notions,
such as Dedekind-completeness, that are not expressible in pml; whereas other properties,
such as finiteness, cannot even be expressed in sopml. Together with the remarks in
Section 5.1 on 3-colorability and the existence of Hamiltonian paths, these results provide
us with some interesting insight into the application of model-theoretic techniques to the1795
analysis of the expressivity of sopml.
In our opinion bisimulations for sopml raise a number of interesting questions. We
believe that one in particular deserves more attention. The Van Benthem theorem is a
well-known result in model theory, stating that modal logic is the bisimulation-invariant
fragment of first-order logic [6]. In the light of the notion of bisimulation provided above,1800
it makes sense to ask the same question in the present context: is sopml the bisimulation-
invariant fragment of monadic second-order logic, possibly when interpreted on a partic-
ular class of frames? In [35] it is proved that the modal µ-calculus is the bisimulation-
invariant fragment of mso, but according to the standard notion of bisimulation for pml.
Presently it is not clear how this result relates to the current setting. We leave this1805
problem open for future work.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we motivated and studied (the use of) second-order propositional modal
logic as a specification language for reasoning about knowledge as well as spatial and
temporal properties in artificial intelligence. Specifically, we aimed at developing proof-1810
and model-theoretic techniques, notably complete axiomatisations and truth-preserving
(bi)simulations, to support the use of sopml in applications. In Section 2 we introduced
20 different classes of Kripke frames, according to the structure of the domain D of
quantification and the features of the accessibility relations. In Section 4 we provided
complete axiomatisations for some of these classes, while proving that other classes are1815
unaxiomatisable.
Further, we introduced suitable notions of (bi)simulation and proved that they pre-
serve the satisfaction of (universal) sopml. Finally, we made use of (bi)simulations to
obtain some inexpressibility results. Specifically, we showed that being finite and having
a Hamiltonian path are not expressible in sopml, while other properties, viz. topological1820
completeness and 3-colorability, are indeed expressible. We conclude that sopml can in-
deed be used as a modelling language for artificial intelligence, particularly for temporal
and spatial reasoning, as well as to describe higher-level knowledge of agents, that is, the
knowledge agents have about other agents’ knowledge and beliefs, as shown in Section 3.




We have presented several results about sopml, but there are of course also a number
of remaining questions for future research.
One such question is the relative expressivity of sopml and qctl. As mentioned in1830
Section 1.1, the variant of sopml with full domain of quantification is similar to one of
the variants of qctl presented in [41], with the main difference being that qctl is based
on ctl, while sopml is based on basic modal logic. The temporal logic ctl has more
operators than modal logic, and it is strictly more expressive. It is not currently clear
whether qctl is also strictly more expressive than sopml, however.1835
Another direction for future research is to find fragments of sopml that are “well-
behaved”. As discussed in Section 4, most of sopml variants are unaxiomatisable on
full frames, and variants that include the reachability operator ◻∗ are unaxiomatisable
even on frames with coarser domains of quantification. It would be interesting to find
fragments of sopml that are large enough to be interesting, but that are axiomatisable1840
or even decidable. In this respect the monodic fragment of first-order modal logic, that
restrict the number of free varibles in the scope of any modal operator, looks promising
[2, 29, 53]. We leave this direction for future work.
At the end of Section 5 we mentioned the interest of checking whether sopml is
the bisimulation-invariant fragment of mso, according to the newly introduced notion1845
of bisimulation. Such a result would provide us with a precise characterisation of the
expressive power of sopml (with respect to mso), in the spirit of van Benthem’s result for
modal logic [6]. It would also be of interest to define games in the style of Ehrenfeucht-
Fräıssé to have a more fine-grained approach to the analysis of the expressivity of sopml,
similarly to the case for first-order and modal logic [34].1850
Finally, here we considered a unique domain D of quantification in any of our frames.
But more elaborate forms of quantification can be taken into account, for instance, we
might consider a different quantification domain for each state in the frame. Then,
we might also consider state-dependent assignments. These variants have been studied
extensively in the realm of first-order modal logic [10, 24], but never addressed in sopml.1855
They might be of interest for specific applications.
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applications to temporal logic (extended abstract), in: W. Brauer (Ed.), Automata, Languages
and Programming, 12th Colloquium, Nafplion, Greece, July 15-19, 1985, Proceedings, Vol. 194 of1980
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 1985, pp. 465–474. doi:10.1007/BFb0015772.
URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0015772
[49] A. P. Sistla, Theoretical issues in the design and verification of distributed systems, Ph.D. thesis,
Carnegie-Mellon University, Cambridge, MA, USA, aAI8403047 (1983).
[50] A. M. Turing, On computable numbers, with an application to the entscheidungsproblem, Proceed-1985
ings of the London Mathematical Society s2-42 (1) (1937) 230–265. doi:10.1112/plms/s2-42.1.
230.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1112/plms/s2-42.1.230
[51] J. Vaananen, Second-order logic and foundations of mathematics, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic
59
7 (4) (2001) 504–520.1990
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2687796
[52] Y. Venema, Derivation rules as anti-axioms in modal logic, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (1993)
1003–1034. doi:10.2307/2275109.
URL http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0022481200021010
[53] F. Wolter, M. Zakharyaschev, Axiomatizing the monodic fragment of first-order temporal logic.,1995
Annals of Pure and Applies Logic 118 (1-2) (2002) 133–145.
60
Appendix A. Selected Proofs
Lemma 11.
1. Let φ be a formula in L∗sopml and F a frame in Kall . If assignments V and V
′
coincide on fr(φ), then2000
(F , V,w) ⊧ φ iff (F , V ′,w) ⊧ φ
2. Recall that X = {ap,pl ,ml , sopml} and ̂= {(ap,all), (pl , bool), (ml ,modal), (sopml ,
full)}. Let x ∈X. Then,
(a) For every ψ ∈ L∗x and model M over F ∈ Kx̂, we have ⟦ψ⟧M ∈D.
(b) If F ∈ Kx̂ and ψ ∈ L
∗
x is free for p in φ, then
(F , V p⟦ψ⟧⟨F,V ⟩ ,w) ⊧ φ iff (F , V,w) ⊧ φ[p/ψ]
Proof. The proofs are by induction on the structure of φ ∈ L∗sopml .2005
1. If φ = p, then fr(φ) = {p} and (M,w) ⊧ φ iff w ∈ V (p) = V ′(p), iff (M′,w) ⊧ φ.
The inductive cases for the propositional connectives are immediate.
If φ = ◻aψ, then (M,w) ⊧ φ iff for all w
′ ∈ Ra(w), (M,w′) ⊧ ψ. Since fr(φ) = fr(ψ),
V and V ′ coincide on fr(ψ) as well, and by induction hypothesis for all w′ ∈ Ra(w),
(M′,w′) ⊧ ψ, i.e., (M′,w) ⊧ φ. The case for φ = ◻∗ψ is similar.2010
If φ = ∀pψ, then (M,w) ⊧ φ iff for any U ∈ D, (MpU ,w) ⊧ ψ. Since fr(φ) = fr(ψ) ∖
{p}, V pU and V
′p
U coincide on fr(ψ), and by induction hypothesis (M
′p
U ,w) ⊧ ψ.
Since U has been chosen arbitrarily, this is the case iff (M′,w) ⊧ φ.
2a The case for x = ap is immediate, as assignments are functions in D. Hence,
V (p) ∈D for every p ∈ AP .2015
The case for x = pl , follows from equalities ⟦¬ψ⟧ =W ∖ ⟦ψ⟧, ⟦ψ ∧ ψ′⟧ = ⟦ψ⟧ ∩ ⟦ψ′⟧,
⟦ψ ∨ ψ′⟧ = ⟦ψ⟧ ∪ ⟦ψ′⟧ and the fact that D is a boolean algebra.
As for x = ml , notice that ⟦◻aψ⟧ = [a](⟦ψ⟧), ⟦◻
∗ψ⟧ = [ ]∗(⟦ψ⟧), and D is a boolean
algebra closed under operators [a] and [ ]∗.
The case for x = sopml , is immediate, as ⟦ψ⟧ ⊆W for every ψ ∈ L∗sopml .2020
2b Let us first consider x = ap. If φ is an atom r, (Mp
V (q),w) ⊧ φ iff w ∈ V
p
V (q)(r), iff
w ∈ V (r) whenever r ≠ p or w ∈ V (q) for r = p. In both cases (M,w) ⊧ φ[p/q].
The inductive cases for propositional connectives and modal operators are imme-
diate, as these simply commute with substitution.
If φ = ∀rϕ for r ≠ p, then (Mp




U ,w) ⊧ ϕ.2025














(q),w) ⊧ ϕ, i.e., (M
r
U ,w) ⊧
ϕ[p/q] by induction hypothesis. But this means that (M,w) ⊧ ∀r(ϕ[p/q]) =
(∀rϕ)[p/q].
As regards cases x = pl ,ml , sopml , we make use of item 1. We only prove the2030
inductive step for φ = ∀rϕ, with r ≠ p, the other cases being similar to the case for




U ,w) ⊧ ϕ.
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Since r ≠ p and ψ is free for p in φ, we have r ∉ fr(ψ), and by item 1 above,
⟦ψ⟧M = ⟦ψ⟧Mr
U
. Therefore assignment (V p⟦ψ⟧)
r











,w) ⊧ ϕ, i.e., (MrU ,w) ⊧ ϕ[p/ψ] by induction hypothesis. But2035
this means that (M,w) ⊧ ∀r(ϕ[p/ψ]) = (∀rϕ)[p/ψ].
Lemma 20. For every model M = ⟨F , V ⟩, world w ∈W , and formula ψ ∈ L∗sopml ,
(M,w) ⊧ ψ iff (F , ρ) ⊧ STx(ψ)
whenever ρ(x) = w and ρ(Pi) = V (pi).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of ψ. Since the steps for modal2040
logic formulas is common, we only show the case for the quantifier. For ψ = ∀pφ, (M,w) ⊧
ψ iff for all U ∈ D, (MpU ,w) ⊧ φ, that is, (F , ρ
′) ⊧ STx(φ) by induction hypothesis, for
ρ′ that coincides with ρ but ρ′(P ) = U . However, this means that (F , ρPU) ⊧ STx(φ), i.e.,
(F , ρ) ⊧ ∀P (STx(φ)) = STx(ψ).
Theorem 23. For every intended lpml model M, w ∈M, and formula ϕ in lpml, we2045
have
(M,w) ⊧ ϕ iff (M,w) ⊧ t(ϕ)
Proof. We will only prove the crucial clause
(M,w) ⊧ ∀p⃗θ(a⃗, p⃗) iff (M,w) ⊧ ⊡(a⃗)
Before doing that, let us first show what it means for the following specific case: θ(a, b, p) =
◻ap → ◻bp, ⊡(a, b) = Sup(a, b), and Θ(a, b, x) = ∀y(Rb(x, y) → Ra(x, y)), also written as
Rb(x) ⊆ Ra(x).2050
⇐ Since (M,w) ⊧ Sup(a, b), we have that Rb(x) ⊆ Ra(x) holds in (M,w), and hence
in (F ,w). Since ◻ap→ ◻bp locally defines Rb(x) ⊆ Ra(x), we have (F ,w) ⊧ (◻ap→ ◻bp),
and in particular (F ,w) ⊧ ∀p(◻ap → ◻bp). Since ∀p(◻ap → ◻bp) is a sentence, we
obtain (M,w) ⊧ ∀p(◻ap → ◻bp). ⇒ Now suppose that (M,w) /⊧ Sup(a, b). Then
(F ,w) /⊧ Sup(a, b). Since ◻ap → ◻bp locally defines Rb(x) ⊆ Ra(x), we know that2055
(F ,w) /⊧ ◻ap → ◻bp, and since F is full, for some assignment V
′, we have (F , V ′,w) /⊧
◻ap→ ◻bp, that is, (M,w) /⊧ ∀p(◻ap→ ◻bp).
As for the general case: ⇐ Since (M,w) ⊧ ⊡(a⃗), we have that Θ(a⃗, x) holds in
(M,w), and hence in (F ,w) (note that Θ ∈ L1fo only talks about what is accessible from
what). Since θ(a⃗, p⃗) locally defines Θ(a⃗, x), we have (F ,w) ⊧ θ(a⃗, p⃗), and in particular2060
(F ,w) ⊧ ∀p⃗θ(a⃗, p⃗). Since ∀p⃗θ(a⃗, p⃗) is a sentence, (M,w) ⊧ ∀pθ(a⃗, p⃗). ⇒ Suppose that
(M,w) /⊧ ⊡(a⃗). Then, (F ,w) /⊧ ⊡(a⃗), and therefore (F ,w) /⊧ Θ(a⃗, x). Since θ(a⃗, p⃗)
locally defines Θ(a⃗, x), we know that (F ,w) /⊧ θ(a⃗, p⃗), and since F is full, for some
assignment V ′, we have (F , V ′,w) /⊧ θ(a⃗, p⃗), that is, (M,w) /⊧ ∀p⃗θ(a⃗, p⃗).
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Lemma 25. Consider formulas ϕi ∈ Lsopml and Θi ∈ L
1
fo in Example 24, for i = 1, . . . ,5.2065
Let x be the only free variable in Θi and assume ρ(x) = w. Assume F is a full frame,
then,
(F ,w) ⊧ ϕi iff (F , ρ) ⊧ Θi
Proof. All items are relatively immediate. We only proved the first and the last ones.
Rather than (F , ρ) ⊧ Θ, we will also write F ⊧ Θ(w), and say that Θ holds for w in F .
1. Suppose F is full and irreflexive at w, that is, ¬Ra(w,w), then clearly (F ,w) ⊧2070
∃p(◻ap∧¬p), by considering the assignment V (p) = Ra(w) for which w ∉ V (p). As
to the converse, suppose that F ,w ⊧ ∃p(◻ap ∧ ¬p). Hence, for every model M on
F , (M,w) ⊧ ∃p(◻ap ∧ ¬p), i.e., (M,w) /⊧ ∀p(◻ap → p). However, by Lemma 20
below, this is the case iff Ra(w,w) does not hold. Hence, Θ1(w) holds in F .
2. Suppose that Θ5(w) holds in F and let V be such that (F , V,w) ⊧ ◻cp. It is easy2075
to check that (F , V q
Ra(w),w) ⊧ ◻aq ∧ ◻b(q → p). In words, if we modify V in such
a way that q becomes true in exactly w’s a-successors, then for every b-successor
of w that satisfies q (note that this successor must then also be an a-successor),
p must be true. Conversely, suppose that Θ5(w) does not hold, i.e., for some
v ∈ W , we have Ra(w, v) and Rb(w, v), but not Rc(w, v). We now show that2080
(F ,w) ⊧ ¬ϕ5 = ∃p(◻cp ∧ ∀q(◻aq → ◇b(q ∧ ¬p))). The assignment V such that
V (p) = Rc(w) is a witness for this: if p is exactly true in the c-successors of w,
then it is false in v, so whenever ◻aq is true in w, we have that q ∧ ¬p holds in v,
and hence ◇b(q ∧ ¬p) holds in w.
2085
Recall that in Section 4.2, we stated the following theorem without proof:
Theorem 62. If ∣I ∣ ≥ 2, then the validities in sopml∗ over modal epistemic frames are
not recursively enumerable.
In particular, sopml∗ is not axiomatisable on the class of modal epistemic frames.
Here, we provide the proof. The proof strategy that we use is very similar to the one2090
used in the proof of Theorem 57: we define formulas ξgrid , ξsane and ξT that serve the
same purpose as ψgrid , ψsane and ψT , respectively.
The main difference lies in how we define a grid, now that we use two-agent S5 as
opposed to single agent K. This time, we use the following pattern: each point (n,m) ∈
Z ×Z is represented not by a single world, but instead by (at least) five different worlds2095
that are related to each other by the relation R(a). One of these five worlds satisfies
the propositional atom center , the other four worlds satisfy the atoms left , right ,up and
down, respectively. The left world of (n,m) is then related by R(b) to the right world













































As before, this allows us to define ◻x and ◊x (for x ∈ dir) as abbreviations:
◻xφ ∶= ◻a(x→ ◻b(¬x→ ◻a(center → φ)))
◊xφ ∶= ◊a(x ∧ ◊b(¬x ∧ ◊a(center ∧ φ)))
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Then we define a grid in almost exactly the same way as the K-case:
ξgrid ∶= ◻















directions ∶= ((left ∨ right)→ (◊bleft ∧ ◊bright ∧ ◻b(left ∨ right)))∧
((up ∨ down)→ (◊bup ∧ ◊bdown ∧ ◻b(up ∨ down)))
same ∶= ⋀
l∈L




uniquex ∶= ∀p(◊xp→ ◻xp))
inversexy ∶=∀p(p→ ◻x ◻y p)
commutexy ∶=∀p(◊x◊yp→ ◻y ◻x p)
where dir , inv dir and perp dir are as before, and L ∶= {left , right ,up,down, center}.
Note that uniquex, inversexy and commutexy are identical to their counterparts in
the proof of Theorem 57, but the other subformulas are different.
If M,w0 ⊧ ξgrid , then we associate the worlds of M with the points of Z × Z in the
following way: (i) w0 and all its a-successors represent (0,0), (ii) if w represents (n,m),2105
M,w ⊧ left , w′ is a b-successor of w and M,w′ ⊧ right , then w′ represents (n − 1,m),
(iii) similarly for the other directions and (iv) if w represents (n,m) then so does every
c-successor of (n,m) for every c /∈ {a, b}.
As before, we show that every point (n,m) is represented by at least one world
and that each world represents at least one point. Since every point is represented2110
by at least one center world, one right world, one left world, one up world and one
down world, we obviously cannot guarantee that all the worlds representing a point are
indistinguishable. We will show, however, that all center worlds representing (n,m) are
modally indistinguishable from one another.
• labels guarantees that every world (i) satisfies exactly one of the labels from L and2115
(ii) has a successor that satisfies l for every l ∈ L.
• directions guarantees that every left world is paired with a right world through the
relation R(b), and similarly for the other directions. Due to how we defined ◊x and
◻x as abbreviations, this means that every center world has and x-successor that
is also a center world, for every x ∈ dir . That, in turn, implies that every point2120
(n,m) is represented by at least one world.
• same says that for every U ∈D, if w is in U then so are all of its a- and b-successors
that share the same label. Since we are working with a modal domain of quantifi-
cation, this implies that every label is unique (up to modal indistinguishability) in
its a- and b-equivalence classes. Note that, together with the fact that left , right ,up2125
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and down worlds occur only in pairs, this implies that whenever a world w rep-
resents some point (n,m), then every a- or b-successor of w also represents some
point (n′,m′). So every world in the generated submodel represents some point
(n,m).
• remain says that for any agent c other than a and b, w is modally indistinguishable2130
from its c-successors. This implies that if w and w′ represent the same point (n,m)
due to rule (iv), then w and w′ are modally indistinguishable.
• The formulas uniquex, inversexy and commutexy, for the relevant x and y, guar-
antee that if w and w′ represent the same point (n,m) due to rules (ii) and (iii),
then w and w′ are modally indistinguishable.2135
We have now shown that every point (n,m) is represented, that every world represents
a point and that all worlds representing a single point are modally indistinguishable.
Variants ξsane and ξT of ψsane and ψT can then be defined. The only required
modification is that in ξsane and ξT we only put requirements on center world, e.g.,
the subformula ⋁s∈states(s∧⋀s′∈states∖{s} ¬s′) of ψsane should be replaced with center →2140
⋁s∈states(s ∧ ⋀s′∈states∖{s} ¬s′) in ξsane . Since these modifications are rather trivial, we
do not list them here in detail.
Overall, if we define ζT ∶= ξgrid ∧ ξsane ∧ ξT ∧ s0 ∧ pos, thenM,w ⊧ ζT implies thatM
encodes the execution of T . It follows that T is non-halting if and only if M,w ⊧ ζT →
◻∗(center → ¬send). In particular, this implies that the valid formulas of sopml∗ over2145
modal S5 frames are not recursively enumerable.
Lemma 87.
1. It can be checked in NPTIME whether there exists a bisimulation relation between
two frames.
2. Let F and F ′ be frames and let w and w′ be worlds of F and F ′, respectively, such2150
that w ≈ w′. Then Fw is boolean (respectively modal) iff F ′w′ is. However, if Fw is
full, then F ′w′ need not be full.
Moreover, if Fw and F
′
w′ are full, then they are isomorphic.
Proof. We provide a proof of point 2. Suppose that w ≈ w′, so there is some
bisimulation (ω,Ω) such that ω(w,w′). Note that it follows that for every world w1 of2155




w′ such that ω(w1,w
′
1), and vice versa.
Now, suppose that D′w′ is closed under complement, and take any U ∈ Dw. There
is at least one U ′ ∈ D′w′ such that Ω(U,U
′). Furthermore, since D′w′ is closed under
complement, we have W ′w′ ∖ U
′ ∈ D′w′ . There is also at least one T ∈ Dw such that
Ω(T,W ′w′ ∖U














′. Exactly one of w′1 ∈ U
′ and w′1 ∈W
′
w′ are true, so we also have
that exactly one of w1 ∈ U and w1 ∈ T is true. So Ww ∖U = T ∈Dw.
We have shown that if D′w′ is closed under complement, then so is Dw. It can be
shown in a similar way that if D′w′ is closed under intersection or under [a] then so is2165
Dw. So Fw is boolean (respectively modal) if F
′
w′ is. Since bisimilarity is symmetrical,
the reverse holds as well.
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In order to see that Fw can be full without Fw′ being full, consider the frame F given
by W = {w},Ra =W ×W,D = 2
W and the frame F ′ given by W ′ = {w′, v′},R′a =W
′×W ′
and D′ = {∅,W ′}. We have w ≈ w′, as witnessed by ω = {(w,w′), (w, v′)} and Ω =2170
{(∅,∅), (W,W ′)}. Furthermore, both frames are identical to their respective generated
submodels. Yet F is full while F ′ is not.
Finally, suppose that Fw and F
′
w′ are both full. Suppose that for some w ∈ Ww we
have ω(w,w′1) and ω(w,w
′















2. So ω is injective. Furthermore,2175
as noted above, for every w1 there is a w
′
1 such that ω(w1,w
′
1) and vice versa, so ω is
surjective. It follows that ω is an isomorphism.
Theorem 74. If w ≈ w′, then for every formula ϕ ∈ L∗sopml ,
(F ,w) ⊧ ϕ iff (F ′,w′) ⊧ ϕ.
Proof. We prove the implication from right to left, the opposite direction
being symmetric. If w ≈ w′ then ω(w,w′) holds for some bisimulation pair (ω,Ω).2180
As above, we show by induction on ϕ that if (F , V,w) /⊧ ϕ for some assignment V ,
then (F ′,Ω(V ),w′) /⊧ ϕ, where Ω(V ) is any assignment such that for every p ∈ AP ,
(Ω(V ))(p) = U ′ with Ω(V (p), U ′). Since ω is a simulation relation in particular, the
base cases for ϕ = p and ϕ = ¬p are as in Theorem 67, as well as the inductive cases for
propositional connectives and ϕ = ◻aψ, ϕ = ◻
∗ψ, and ϕ = ∀pψ.2185
For ϕ = ◇aψ, (F
′,Ω(V ),w′) ⊧ ϕ iff for some v′ ∈ R′a(w
′), (F ′,Ω(V ), v′) ⊧ ψ. By
bisimulation, for some v ∈ Ra(w), ω(v, v
′). In particular, (F , V, v) ⊧ ψ by induction
hypothesis. That is, (F , V,w) ⊧ ϕ. The case for ϕ =◇∗ψ is similar.
For ϕ = ∃pψ, (F ′,Ω(V ),w′) ⊧ ϕ iff for some U ′ ∈ D′, (F ′, (Ω(V ))pU ′ ,w
′) ⊧ ψ. Now
consider U ∈D such that Ω(U,U ′) ∈D. In particular, assignments (Ω(V ))pU ′ and Ω(V
p
U )2190
coincides. Hence, (F ′,Ω(V pU ),w
′) ⊧ ψ, and by induction hypothesis, (F , V pU ,w) ⊧ ψ for
U ∈D, that is, (F , V,w) ⊧ ϕ.
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